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EU and Russia (EUC Report)

My Lords, not being a member of the committee, I add my thanks for the enormous work it has done. I apologise for arriving a little late. I want to concentrate on Chapter 6 of the report, ““The Common Neighbourhood and International Security Issues””, particularly the dangers of encouraging countries in Russia’s ““near abroad””, such as Georgia and the Ukraine, both with significant Russian minorities, to hope to become NATO members. As we all know, the Caucasus, like the Balkans, where the First World War broke out, is a cauldron of seething ethnic animosities. The committee is right to point out that the EU should listen more carefully to what the Russians have to say. It has never been properly explained how we can encourage NATO’s relentlessly eastward expansion without provoking a strong Russian reaction. Like the noble Lord, Lord Crickhowell, I note the comment at question 174 that the Russians feel betrayed by the West over its abandonment of the assurances it gave in the early 1990s that NATO would not be enlarged. Agreement in principle to site bases in the Czech Republic and Poland has been the last straw. On the other hand, nothing excuses the recent Russian actions in Georgia and, in the same vein, the comments of the Russian President that: "““We are not afraid of anything, including the prospect of a new Cold War””." He ignored today’s economic interdependence of Europe and Russia. How well thought out was our Foreign Secretary’s recent visit to the Ukraine? Bronwen Maddox, the chief foreign commentator in the Times, in a report on 28 August, enthuses about the visit and heaps praise on the Foreign Secretary—including on his haircut. She quotes him as saying: "““It is clear to me, standing here today, that this is a European country … once it fulfils the criteria, it should be accepted as a full member, and we should help you get there””—" that is to say, into the EU and NATO. As regards whether there was due consideration, preparation and deep thinking before the visit, Ms Maddox lets the cat out of the bag, saying that the Foreign Secretary conceived the Ukrainian trip a week ago, according to aides, on his dash to Tbilisi. She praises his astute choice. I am not sure. Sir Mark Lyall Grant, the political director of the FCO, points out that Russia distinguishes very clearly between the EU and NATO because the United States is in one but not the other. I find it curious that, not since Curzon was Foreign Secretary in 1919, has a British Foreign Secretary shown such an interest in the Caucasus. I am sure that the Foreign Secretary is extremely familiar with the charter of NATO, commended by Ernest Bevin to the House of Commons on 14 May 1949, and the North Atlantic Pact, which was debated a little earlier, on 18 March that year. I remind noble Lords of Article 5, referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Skidelsky. I have checked the words: "““The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all””." The use of armed force can follow—one for all and all for one. It is therefore not only the interests of applicants that should be heard; those of existing NATO members should be considered very carefully. Do we all want to get entangled in supporting Georgian or Ukrainian ambitions? Encouraging democracy is one thing; entering into commitments is another, especially any military obligation which could not conceivably be fulfilled. In fairness to the Foreign Secretary, while voicing support he did not say that Britain would actually lobby for giving countries a membership action plan, referred to by my noble friend Lord Anderson—the start of the process—when NATO Ministers meet in December. So far as we are concerned, I give a little reassurance to my noble friend: the pass does not seem to have been sold because that assurance was not given. We should be extremely careful—I hope that this will not be taken in the wrong way. Words to encourage democracy are one thing, but we must be careful not to posture on the world stage and not to take into full account what obligations mean. We have been in our lifetime through many of those instances when obligations are called upon to be paid. Most of us have lived through the experience of the Cold War. I was a mere youth when the NATO charter was agreed. In Germany, as a young soldier, I was occasionally asked to guard a train from Hanover to Berlin with the blinds down, going through another sector, and seeing the Berlin Wall. None of us want to go back to that. We must be extremely careful not to provoke that. I know also of the continuing Russian fury regarding our intervention in Kosovo in the face of what, undoubtedly, was genocide on a huge scale. As Attorney-General, I had to approve, on a daily basis during the 68 days, each and every one of the air targets to ensure that they kept within our legal obligations. In April, when I spoke to some M embers of the Russian Duma they were not persuaded about the merit of our actions. There is a concern that to compare one with the other—what happened in Kosovo with the problem of the minorities in Georgia and Ukraine—is ridiculous. I would therefore suggest to the Government and the Foreign Minister that they make full reappraisal of where the British interests, referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton, lie. We should be careful to consider that before the meeting of NATO Ministers in December. The Cabinet should be reminded of our obligations, our rights in NATO and where expansion could lead us. Having considered these, the Cabinet and the Foreign Secretary would be better armed to reach a consensus with countries that are geographically much nearer to the applicant countries. There could be a heavy price to pay for relentless expansion eastwards.