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Energy Bill

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, presented his amendment in his usual persuasive way, but I shall not meet him very constructively on this amendment. Against that background, however, and after dinner—but not because of it—I will be much more positive on his subsequent amendments in which I see merit. I shall indicate to him how we intend to respond constructively on them; however I must resist this amendment, despite the noble Lord’s persuasive powers. It is critical that the Secretary of State’s power to make modifications or impose obligations is not fettered by a materiality threshold. This is because his power to propose a modification is integral to the enforcement and sanction regime and for ensuring that operators pay for the full costs of decommissioning and their full share of waste management and disposal costs. The noble Lord will appreciate how central that is to the whole concept of the Bill, in so far as it affects nuclear energy. In the event of a breach of the programme, the Secretary of State might choose to modify the programme prior to, or instead of, taking formal enforcement action. For example, rather than prosecute, he might decide to impose an obligation on the operator to put in place a procedure to ensure that the breach did not occur again. If the Secretary of State could only propose a modification where it met the conditions proposed by the amendment, the integrity of his sanction and enforcement regime might be undermined. We regard that as a serious problem with regard to the amendment. For instance, it might preclude persons with responsibility for managing the fund to propose an increase in the level of the operator’s contributions to the fund. This is because the proposal might not have a material impact on the amount of waste and decommissioning costs, but would instead affect the ability of the fund to accrue the necessary money to meet those costs. Clearly, we would want those managing the fund to have the option to propose a modification to the programme. I accept, as the noble Lord indicated, that we are talking about an industry decades ahead. These programmes will run over a considerable period. While the changes of the kind that I have described might not impact on the actual costs of the decommissioning and waste liabilities, the power to modify the programme in these circumstances will be critical in ensuring that the right level of security is in place to ensure that those costs are met. The amendment would not allow these modifications to be proposed, which would undermine the robustness of the regime. I am concerned about one or two other points. The amendment brings into question the role of the Nuclear Liabilities Financing Assurance Board, which I will refer to as NLFAB. It is important that we strike the balance between ensuring that the operators of new nuclear power stations notify and seek prior approval from the Secretary of State for those modifications that have a significant impact on the waste and decommissioning liability, without imposing too great an administrative burden on operators. It was said in the other place that the operator would be expected to propose modifications and seek approval where a change to the programme had a significant impact on decommissioning or waste cost estimates. That remains our policy. I am sure that the noble Lord will see the strength of the point that I wish to make about NLFAB. The amendment would make it a requirement for the relevant persons to take the advice of NLFAB prior to proposing a modification. However, the role of this body is to advise the Secretary of State on any proposal to make a modification. In particular, its role is to provide assurance that appropriate financial arrangements will be put in place by operators to meet the costs of decommissioning and waste management arising from the stations. That is central to the Bill. NLFAB will provide independent advice to Ministers as they consider proposals from operators who wish to build new nuclear power stations. It is not NLFAB's job to provide advice to the site operator or any body corporate associated with the operator. It will be for the operator and persons responsible for managing the fund to have the relevant information within their programme verified before it is submitted to the Secretary of State. If NLFAB were to provide advice to any person who could submit a proposal, as the amendment indicates, the impartiality and independence of the very advice that NLFAB is expected to give to the Secretary of State would be compromised. I am trying to meet the noble Lord on the obvious point that we do not want to place unnecessary administrative burdens on the operator, against a background in which we all recognise that when one is making provision for an industry over decades, one must have clear principles, but must take on board the necessity for modifications. I hope that I have indicated that the Government believe that there are sufficient negative aspects to the noble Lord’s amendment which render it unacceptable. I hope that, having pressed the Government with it, he will feel that he can safely withdraw it.