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Foreign Affairs and Defence

It is a pleasure to be able to contribute to this debate. I intend to be brief because I know that other Members wish to speak. I was pleased to hear the Foreign Secretary say that he was determined to continue to support our troops in Iraq and in Afghanistan. I wish to focus my comments on one particular issue—the Government's decision to withdraw the Harrier from Afghanistan and replace it with the Tornado from 1 April 2009. There are many arguments floating around as to why that should be, with conspiracy theories about inter-service rivalries—about the Royal Air Force wishing to finish off the Fleet Air Arm or wishing to maintain control over the future joint strike fighter. I am not qualified even to begin to comment on those conspiracy theories, so I will leave that to somebody else. Following on from a debate in Westminster Hall, I would like to construct an argument that is based purely on factual answers that I have received to parliamentary questions. Before I do that, I would like to say through you, Madam Deputy Speaker, how disappointing it has been to receive some of those answers from the Ministry of Defence. In the past 10 days alone, we have had to correct the parliamentary record on three occasions. When I first asked whether the Harrier had served in Operation Telic, I was told that it never had, and then, as a result of the answer to Question 239716, we discovered that it had. I asked how much has been spent on operational requirements for the Harrier in Afghanistan, and following the answer to Question 238824, we had to correct the parliamentary record. I asked how many Harrier pilots had served in Afghanistan, and we had to correct the parliamentary record again. I am afraid to have to say to the Minister that I fear that even the corrections to the parliamentary record will have to be corrected in the next few days. It is not only hon. Members who are getting misinformation. During the debate in Westminster Hall, the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, the hon. Member for North Durham (Mr. Jones), who is now sitting on the Front Bench, said:"““In some ways the Tornado brings capabilities that the Harrier does not, such as the 27 mm cannon and the new RAPTOR imaging system—the reconnaissance airborne pod Tornado—which has been used very effectively in Iraq and, I am told, will be in Afghanistan as well.””—[Official Report, Westminster Hall, 19 November 2008; Vol. 483, c. 95WH.]" That is factually incorrect, as we discovered in the answer to Question 241200 that the RAPTOR imaging system will not be fitted to aircraft deployed to Afghanistan. If Ministers and hon. Members are being given misinformation and the parliamentary record is having to be corrected on such a regular basis, how can we even begin to make these decisions? It is pretty worrying. Perhaps we start at a point where we do agree, which is that there were initially concerns that the Harrier's continued operation in Afghanistan would affect its airframe life. I am delighted that that was put to rest in the letter to me from the Under-Secretary after the debate. It appears that the operations in Afghanistan are less of a strain on the Harrier airframe than training for peace in the UK. From a financial perspective, that decision seems to make absolutely no sense. During the past few years, we have spent £885 million on upgrading the Harrier to its current performance level in Afghanistan. The upgrade to capability E—an extra capability for Afghanistan—cost £728 million. The new Mk 107 engine cost £122 million. Urgent operational requirements for the Harrier in Afghanistan cost £45 million. The total is £885 million, with annual running costs of £20 million. According to the answer to Question 238825 on 24 November, that is £16.5 million more than if the Harrier were to operate solely in the UK. What will be spent to put the Tornado into theatre? In answer to Question 238826, we discovered that £40 million of urgent operational requirements is needed to bring the Tornado up to basic theatre entry level. We need £7.5 million for the theatre entry standard upgrade and some £20 million to sustain it. That makes £67.5 million simply to change two aircraft over in theatre. The Secretary of State may not take my word for it, but I understand that the National Audit Office is doing a detailed report on the financial decisions taken on this matter, and they will be published shortly. Having been in theatre only two weeks ago, I understand that that report will be pretty damning about those decisions. The Royal Air Force has relied on claims that harmony guidelines are not being met. Fascinatingly, I have been trying to get information on this matter out of the Ministry of Defence for some time. Back on 24 March, my hon. Friend the Member for Woodspring (Dr. Fox) asked about the matter in Question 193887, and he was told that no Harrier pilots were then breaching harmony guidelines. When I ask similar questions now, however, I am told that the information is not held centrally. Why was it available in March but not available now? Could it perhaps be that the information does not support the RAF's argument any more? It has taken me three weeks to establish what the harmony guidelines are. We end up with a complicated picture, as they are different for each of the services. They are different for formed units and for individuals. For example, the Royal Navy sets separated service at a maximum of 660 days in a three-year period. How many Royal Navy Harrier pilots have been away for 660 days in the past three years? I doubt that any have been. The RAF has a separated service planning target of 280 days in a 24-month rolling period. How many RAF Harrier pilots have been away for that period? I doubt that many have. As a serving soldier, I looked at my pay statement last week; in the bottom right-hand corner it tells me exactly how many longer separated service allowance days I have had in the past three years. That is on my pay statement; surely it must be on individual statements throughout the armed forces. If I were in the RAF at the moment, at Cottesmore, knowing that that information was held at a squadron level, I would try to choose a 20-month period which has a minimum number of Royal Navy Harrier pilots, because its harmony guidelines are far lower, and maximises the number of RAF pilots to try and prove the argument. Harmony guidelines are a bit of a red herring in this argument. We have had some debate about the capability of the two airframes. I will not go into detail on that, but we have already seen from the answer to parliamentary Question 240495 that Tornado will not be deploying with RAPTOR, as the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, the hon. Member for North Durham, said it would. We also discovered in the answer to parliamentary Question 239740 that it will be unable to carry the Paveway 4 missile—the great new weapon that is supposed to help with proportionality. It will, however, be able to do so in the future once the urgent operational requirements are complete. Perhaps that is the crucial part of the argument. There is now some acceptance, partly through parliamentary questions that have not been answered, that there will be a difference between the initial operating capability of the Tornado when it first goes to theatre on 1 April 2009, and its final operating capability, which will be higher and will hopefully come somewhere near that of the Harrier. We will not get drawn into the detail of that, but there is an acceptance that there will be a dip in capability initially, after it is first deployed, and we will get back to a higher capability after a period of weeks—or perhaps months. I see one Minister nodding and one shaking his head; perhaps that tells me everything about the confusion in the Department at the moment. My question is simple: given that there is now an acceptance that there will be a different capability, why can we simply not delay the deployment of Tornado until its final operating capability is met? That would ensure that the troops on the ground received the same level of support as they do today. There are no arguments against harmony. Chinook pilots currently go for two, four or five months, so why is 1 April so vital? Is it simply because we are determined to try to save the red faces of the MOD, which has set that date in stone, or is it because if the Harrier is not in theatre after 1 April, it will be subject to the programme review and face cuts? If neither of those is the answer, perhaps the Secretary of State will say when he winds up why we cannot slip this, when it is only a matter of weeks—I have been assured that it is not months. Will he assure me that there will not be any cuts to the Harrier force? These are important matters and I am concerned that the main reason they are not being dealt with now is to save embarrassment, careers and the Royal Air Force's face instead of ensuring that we get maximum protection and support to our troops on the ground. There is risk and that is accepted; Ministers have accepted that there is a risk in sending Tornado, but it is their job to judge whether that risk is acceptable. If we discover in time that they have taken that risk, which the parliamentary answers I have received have shown is unacceptable and unnecessary, and we discover that troops have been injured or—God forbid—killed, it will be tragic, and I, personally, will be determined to try to hold the people who took that decision to account.