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Banking Bill

Clause 57: Valuation principles Debate on whether Clause 57 should stand part of the Bill. I tabled my opposition to Clause 57 standing part of the Bill in order to initiate a short debate about the role of valuation principles in the context of a valuation. My fundamental question is why Clause 57 needs to exist if an independent valuer, who is presumably competent to carry out a valuation, is appointed. I do not object to the content of subsection (3), which ensures that a valuer does not pass on the value of financial assistance provided by the taxpayer to anyone else. That is perfectly correct. I do query, however, why compensation orders might need to be assessed by the principles set out in subsection (2). Those principles could produce a result which was not of value in any ordinary sense. Why, for example, are certain methods of valuation to be ruled out? Why is the valuer being deprived of the use of judgment in the correct methods to use? In what circumstances do the Government expect to use subsection (2)? The Minister has been at pains to point out how the valuer will be appointed in an independent way, and one can only assume that the Government will ensure that the person will be of some standing, experience and competence. Under subsection (2), however, the Government can tell us exactly what to do. I am also troubled by subsection (4), which is familiar territory to anyone who has been involved with the Northern Rock valuation order. My problem is that if these principles are insisted upon as opposed to applied as relevant in the judgment of the valuer, it may produce a result which is not fair. Fairness was debated in another place. My honourable friend David Gauke moved an amendment in which he tried to introduce a principle of fairness into the valuation process. Unfortunately the Government did not feel able to accept that helpful amendment. Let us suppose that a failing bank was hit with the special resolution regime but that the authorities were over-hasty in their judgment. The Minister will recognise that this is a concern that has been expressed in relation to the powers under this Bill; that is why we are particularly concerned about the nature of the hurdle in Clause 7, which we debated earlier. Let us suppose that the valuer finds that the bank was capable of operating as a going concern on plausible assumptions. Or let us assume that he finds that administration would not have been an appropriate basis for action. Subsection (4) allows the Treasury to specify a counterfactual. If the authorities had been over-hasty, there would be a strong incentive for them to use subsection (4) in order not to let the correct position emerge. It would be wholly inappropriate to debate the specifics of the Northern Rock case in view of the current legal action. The Minister will be aware, however, that shareholders, and not just the hedge funds, felt strongly that their assets were being expropriated and would not be correctly valued because of the application of the valuation principles which were insisted upon in that valuation order. It is not implausible that this could happen if the powers were used in future. In addition, the existence of the power of the Treasury to specify a valuation assumption, perceived by others to be unreasonable, seems likely to lead to a string of judicial reviews, if nothing else. All in all, it seems fairer and, indeed, more efficient in valuation terms to leave everything to the valuer’s judgment. I look forward to the Minister’s response on why the Treasury needs the powers set out in Clause 57.