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Finance Bill

Indeed, it is not just honourable; it is the correct way to proceed. I used to start debates in Committee by saying, "Look, this is for discussion and we are looking to get it right." If a point then came when the Minister made a sensible compromise or came to an agreement—not that that would necessarily happen, because in those days the Opposition had often not even tabled an amendment for the first sitting—we would hear, "The Government are collapsing! A huge concession! Holes knocked in the legislation!" That is not what Committee is about. I never had a problem with reaching for amendments, if that was the right thing to do—that is the whole purpose of the process—providing, of course, that they did not vitiate the essence or the purpose of the Bill. Indeed, if an amendment commends itself to the Minister, it should enhance the Bill. I was interested in what the hon. Member for Fareham said about the law that was introduced in the United States in the wake of the Enron and WorldCom scandals, when the United States went in for what we called "heavy regulation", which contrasted with what we over here called "light-touch regulation", which I am sure the hon. Gentleman and the Financial Secretary will remember. I was not in the Treasury at the time, but I knew what was going on. We thought that that difference would give us a huge competitive edge, but it is interesting to see how things turned out. That issue was meant to be about financial controls, but what went wrong with the banks was, in large part, to do with the lack of financial controls, albeit in a different sector now. Despite the heavy regulation in the United States, the problem started there—Gillian Tett has shown that clearly in her book "Fool's Gold"—and then it spread, and we are clearly caught up in it. However, that regulation did no good for the sector that was about to blow up in the United States, whereas our light-touch regulation is now being blamed for what happened here. What clearly went wrong was that people were not being intelligent about regulation—that is what it comes down to—and neither were the central banks. Although we took away regulation from the Bank of England and gave it to the Financial Services Authority, the Bank still had an overall direct responsibility. I remember Eddie George saying, "I'm afraid of a systemic collapse," which is why he wanted that responsibility, and the money for it. That responsibility was clearly left with the Bank of England when we made that change. It is no good for the Bank to say, "It was all passed over to the FSA." It was not: the integrity of the entire banking system was left clearly with the Bank. Everybody was looking at the wrong thing, or not looking hard enough at the right thing. That is what happened in the United States. If we do not focus intelligently on the area that poses a threat to the economy, we will do no good, whatever sort of regulation we have, however many people we have and however many pieces of legislation we have to back it up.