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Proceeding contribution from George Osborne (Conservative) in the House of Commons on Wednesday, 8 July 2009. It occurred during Ministerial statement on Reforming Financial Markets.


Reforming Financial Markets

I thank the Chancellor for his statement, although frankly almost all of it was splashed over the front pages of today's newspapers. Once again, Parliament comes last, instead of coming first. Of course, there are some elements of the White Paper that we welcome: the improved consumer advice; David Walker's report on corporate governance, to which we look forward; a much better resolution regime for failed banks, which is clearly necessary; and the Chancellor's remarks on pay and bonuses, although he could have set a better example with the pay and bonus package for the chief executive of RBS. However, in most part, this White Paper is a totally inadequate response to what has happened over the last two years. For a start, the White Paper contains no serious analysis of what went wrong. I received a copy of it only 20 minutes ago, during Prime Minister's questions, but the only admission that I can see of any responsibility for what happened is the sentence that states that""the crisis has shown that aspects of prudential and macro-prudential supervision…were insufficient."" That is the understatement of the century, given that half the British banking system has had to be nationalised. It also ducks every difficult question that needs to be addressed if we are to protect our society and our economy from a repeat of the mistakes that have caused such trouble. How do we replace the failed tripartite regime? What tools do we need to stop the excessive debt levels that did so much damage to our economy? How do we ensure that we have a banking system that competes across the world, and offers families and small businesses in this country the services that they are currently denied in this credit crunch, without the British taxpayer picking up the bill for the mistakes that are made? None of those difficult questions is properly addressed today; every single one is left to the next Government to deal with. It is more of a white flag than a White Paper—a complete surrender of this Government's responsibility to fix the system for regulating the City that they created and which so spectacularly failed. Let me press the Chancellor on some specifics on the conduct and content of regulation. First, on the tripartite regime, he must see how dysfunctional it has become. Institutional jealousies and blurred lines of responsibility mean that everyone gets involved but no one is in charge. Let us remember where this all began—with the arrogant decision from the new Chancellor in 1997, without warning or consultation, and in the teeth of the opposition of the late Eddie George, to remove banking supervision from the Bank of England. My right hon. Friend the Member for Hitchin and Harpenden (Mr. Lilley), the then Shadow Chancellor, warned from this Dispatch Box that it would leave no one responsible for the liquidity of the banking system or guarding against systemic collapse. Sadly, that prophecy turned out to be all too true. No one was responsible for liquidity. No one was looking at systemic risk. Even the FSA itself admits that it took its eye off prudential supervision. When the crunch came over Northern Rock, no one knew who was in charge. Almost two years later, we still do not know who is in charge. The Chancellor should have come here today to bury the tripartite system, not to praise it. The only thing that stops him is the vanity of the Prime Minister who refuses to admit that he made such a fundamental mistake. The same applies to the content of regulation. The first half of Lord Turner's report contains the most damning critique of what went wrong with this Government's economic policy. He points to the "major and continued macro-imbalances" in the British economy. He says that the failure to spot this was""one of the crucial failures of the years running up to the financial crisis"," and he says that the""vital activity of macro-prudential analysis...fell between two stools"." What does this White Paper propose to do with that vital activity in future? It puts it between two stools again. After two years of thinking in the Treasury—wait for it—we are going to have a council on financial stability that will bring together the Treasury, the Bank of England and the FSA. I thought that that was what the tripartite regime was supposed to be about all along. We do not need another divided committee. We do not want more divided responsibilities. We need clear lines of accountability that run all the way to Threadneedle street. They do not exist at present. Instead of clarity, what we get from the Government is confusion. The Governor of the Bank of England appeared before the Select Committee on the Treasury two weeks ago, and he said:""We were given a statutory responsibility for financial stability in the Banking Act, and the question…to which I have not really received any adequate answer from anywhere, was: what exactly is it that people expect the Bank of England to do?"" We are none the wiser after this White Paper. Perhaps it would have helped if the Chancellor had shown the White Paper in draft to the Governor of the Bank of England two or three weeks ago instead of in recent days. Is it not absolutely clear that the Bank of England now has to be given not just the responsibility but the tools for macro-prudential regulation? Can the Chancellor confirm that there is not a single new power for the Bank of England in the White Paper? The Bank of England should have the power to call time on debt, as we suggested almost a year ago; it should be able to set counter-cyclical capital rules in conjunction with other countries—and, by the way, that would be a much better use of international co-operation than the current proposals from the European Commission, which are ill conceived and damaging to the UK—and it should have the statutory powers to intervene when the structure of a financial institution threatens the whole economy, so that, in the Governor's words, it can force its "sermons" to be listened to. The Bank of England cannot do any of those things unless it has the experience and knowledge of their day-to-day regulation. Let me make it clear to the Chancellor today that the next Conservative Government will abolish the tripartite system, and let me tell Parliament first—unlike his policy—that we will put the Bank of England in charge of the prudential supervision of our banks, our building societies and our other significant financial institutions. We have learned from this crisis the old truth that one cannot separate central banking from the supervision of the financial system and that sound regulation is not just about a checklist of rules but about the authority to exercise judgment and to see the bigger picture. Sitting alongside a stronger Bank of England we will have a powerful regulator to protect consumers—a regulator with the clout and focus not just to add more health warnings alongside the acres of small print that already come with financial products but to stamp out unfair practices such as mis-sold payment protection insurance and excessive bank charges. We will set out the details of that in our own alternative White Paper later this month. Will not the choice be clear then? We have today a submission from the Labour party, which will be implemented in full only if it is re-elected, and proposals from the Conservative party. The Labour party wants to stick with the financial system that failed us, which it created. We propose to overhaul that system and put the Bank of England in charge. People will know at the next election that if they want to change the way in which the City and our banks are regulated, they need to change their Government.


Secondary information

Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
495 c972-5 
Session
2008-09
Chamber / Committee
House of Commons chamber
Subjects
Consumers Banks Cooperation Competition Advisory services Bank of England Finance Education Investment Financial services Financial institutions International cooperation Financial Services Authority Interest rates Financial markets Personal savings Protection Pay Management Mortgages Loans Regulation Treasury Government guaranteed credit Financial Services Compensation Scheme Council for Financial Stability
Link
View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk