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Defence Policy

I have the same experience as the Secretary of State—I know that the question is coming, and every single time I allow the opportunity for it. The hon. Gentleman knows I have often said that the seaborne air power projection is important for expeditionary capability, but we have also said that if we are going into a strategic defence review, we must maintain the discipline of considering everything properly in its time. We need to stick to that. I want to mention another issue about our naval mission in Iraq that I would like the Minister to tackle specifically in his winding-up speech. It now appears that we will resume our training mission in the near future. What about its financing? In the Secretary of State's letter to me dated 25 September—I thank him for keeping me updated throughout summer recess on the matter, as he promised—he provided an explanatory memorandum on the agreement for training. It states:""The costs associated with the provision of training and maritime support for Iraqi Forces will continue to be borne by HMG under existing arrangements for Operation Telic. The Treasury has agreed in principle to fund the additional costs for these military activities from the Reserve."" Will the Minister tell us unequivocally that the costs for any and all UK training missions in Iraq and the Gulf will be met by the reserve and not from the core budget? The recent PAC report that I mentioned earlier also highlights the Government's failure to ensure that our troops are properly trained to carry out their tasks. We know that there is a shortage of armoured vehicles for our troops to train on before they go to Afghanistan. The PAC report went on to say that""there have been equipment shortages in many areas and some key equipment was missing altogether. Many troops have not had direct experience of some equipment, such as electronic counter-measures systems, before arriving in theatre"." I am sure that the whole House agrees that no soldier should ever have to train on or see a major piece of equipment for the first time in Afghanistan. Let us consider parachute training. Our Paras have a proud and gallant history. Our troops are expected to train like they fight, but now the Paras are being forced to jump from civilian aeroplanes flown by civilian pilots, when neither would be a wartime possibility. It is a matter for grave concern that parachute training and preparedness has reached that low level. Baroness Taylor said yesterday in the other place:""the current capability is there. The lack of parachute training is not having an effect on the mandated operational capacity."—[Official Report, House of Lords, 14 October 2009; Vol. 713, c. 218.]" Many would disagree. When more than a third of parachute troops are unable to jump from a plane, which is what distinguishes them from their light infantry counterparts, there is a lack of capability. The lack of parachuting may not be impacting on current operations in Afghanistan, but what about our ability to react to the unexpected? According to the latest figures provided by the Government, more than a third of those who should be able to parachute are not trained to do so. The situation with our reserve forces generally, and the TA especially, is worse than in other areas. Eighteen thousand members of our reserve forces, most of whom were from the TA, have fought in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2002, and we are extremely fortunate as a nation to have had those reserve forces available to us. However, the Government's treatment of the reserve forces is unforgivable. In 1997, the establishment figure for the TA was 59,000. Today it is 38,500, even though the current strength is 28,920. We learned last April that thousands more TA positions would be cut from the establishment figure. According to the Government's latest figures, 12 out of the 14 TA infantry battalions are under strength. On 28 April, in a statement to which he has referred, the Secretary of State said:""Initial training will be restructured so that new recruits receive sufficient military skills to participate in their units' collective training within six months of joining, and are fully trained and eligible for mobilisation in three years. Routine training will also be reviewed and sufficient man training days allocated to ensure that annual military competency standards can be achieved by all."—[Official Report, 28 April 2009; Vol. 491, c. 702.]" As several hon. Members have already pointed out, we have now learned that training for all members of the TA who are not going to Afghanistan in the next year is going to be cut. The operational budget for the TA for this financial year was £38 million. We now know that it is going to be cut to around £23 million. That will have a very negative impact on the long-term readiness of the TA and long-term recruitment. Let me give the House a graphic example. A young man sent me an email today. It states:""I have always had an interest in the armed forces so at the freshers fair this year"—" at King's college—""I jumped at the chance to join the London University Officer Training Corps, not only would I be trained by the military, develop my leadership skills but I would also get paid – always a good thing as a student struggling to pay a loan!...So after successfully getting in through the rigorous interviews and selection weekend (held in norfolk) I arrived for my first training evening, excited, keen and willing to learn! We were sat down in the hall and the Major walked out and announced bluntly – 'There will be NO pay for any training officers this year.' He went on to tell us about how the whole Army was facing a cut back. I think this is outrageous! We're fighting two large wars, as training officers we should be seen as the next generation…properly respected and paid!"" The Government are willing to spend £12 billion on a pointless VAT cut to support their political reputation, but they are unwilling to spend £20 million to train the TA while we are at war in Afghanistan. That shows a very twisted set of priorities. The Government need to understand that for many in the TA, the TA is a habit: break the habit, break the TA. That is exactly what their proposals will do. For our defence policy to be successful, we must have a clear strategy, defined objectives and the necessary military capabilities. Too often, this Government have simply not been up to the task. They are losing support among the public for the mission in Afghanistan, because they do not tell them why we need to be there in terms of our clear national security priorities. They are not making clear what losing would mean and they are not clearly defining what success would look like. We need better supplied forces in Afghanistan, with better spares and equipment. Ultimately, the question is how much we value our forces. The TA decision is disgraceful and penny-pinching, and it is a shameful way to treat the volunteers in the TA. It may save £20 million, but the Government are willing to spend any amount to bail out their reputation in the middle of an economic crisis of their own making. In Afghanistan and elsewhere, whether dealing with equipment or our forces, if we will the ends, we must will the means. Half of what is needed will not buy us half a victory. Our armed forces deserve so much better than they are getting from this Government.