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Defence Policy

My daughter concluded her message by asking me whether I think she should continue with it. I hope she is watching this debate, and if she is I can tell her—I have never communicated with my family in this way before—that I very much hope that she will, because it is one of the best things anyone can possibly do. To the Government, however, I communicate the following: to take the advice of chiefs of staff—who will always support the regulars when faced with choices between priorities—and to cut off this link between the civilian population and the military in order to save £20 million will result in units going out of existence. It is a short-sighted and wrong decision, and I ask the Government, please, to think again. We have also heard today about Bernard Gray's report on procurement. The decision the Government took in July to delay its publication for as long as possible—and even, possibly, not to produce it at all—was extraordinary and ridiculous. It gave the impression that they had something to hide. It was not that there was something to hide; this is something to be brought out into the open and discussed so that we can put the endemic problems right. The key recommendation in the Bernard Gray report is that the costings and truthfulness of the equipment programme should be subject to independent audit by a large firm of outside independent auditors and that the Government and their programme should be subject to a "going concern" test. We know that at present the equipment programme would not pass a "going concern" test—and we also know that the Government would not pass a "going concern" test. In order to get this right, we must have a realistic equipment programme. That means that if we were to follow Bernard Gray's recommendations, the first year would be very difficult. I must draw attention to the fact that the first year will involve some tough decisions. Other key recommendations of an excellent report are aimed at the perverse incentives within the Ministry of Defence, whereby our procurement process means that we are almost bound to end up with the wrong decisions; at the absence of skills within the MOD and how skills, particularly those in project management, can be built up and required; and at the need for long-term budgets—10-year budgets—for the MOD. I warned all three Front-Bench teams that although the Treasury will have a bit of difficulty with that, it must be seen off. Long-term budgets for a Department that sometimes builds equipment that takes years to bring into commission and then lasts for a further 50 years are essential. The recommendations also include the holding of regular defence reviews, which has been an excellent policy of the Conservative party for some time. I am not sure whether it is a Government policy yet—I very much hope that it is.