---

Defence Policy

This has been a very good debate with some excellent speeches, particularly on Afghanistan. I do not want to dwell too much on Afghanistan save to say that in May I was in Kabul visiting ISAF headquarters and Afghan Ministers. Having previously been in Kabul about two years ago, I came away very depressed by the deterioration of the security situation in the area—it had got significantly worse in the intervening period. I want to deal with some wider long-term defence issues as regards the projection of British foreign policy through our armed forces and our common interest with our European neighbours, particularly France. More specifically, I want to discuss how European members of the alliance can make a greater contribution to our collective defence. Before I do that, I want to deal with a technical issue that is affecting the security and safety of our servicemen and women. European nations that are members of both NATO and the EU can deploy in the same theatre under different commands—EU or NATO—and find that they cannot communicate with each other. That puts the security and lives of our men and women significantly at risk. I have raised this before with regard to Operation Atalanta, the anti-piracy mission off the coast of Somalia, where ships of NATO nations acting together under EU command cannot access NATO communications and intelligence systems. It is plainly daft that they cannot communicate with ships of the same nation that are acting under NATO command or combined taskforce—CTF—151. In Afghanistan, NATO nations participating in the police mission under EUPOL are denied access to the NATO identification system, known as "blue tracking". In a recent meeting that I had with General John McColl, the NATO deputy supreme commander, it was evident that this is seriously endangering the lives of men and women on the ground. There is a similar situation in Kosovo, where NATO security forces cannot communicate with EULEX, the European Union rule of law mission; again, that puts our men's and women's lives at risk. In theory, the Berlin-plus arrangements should make such a situation unnecessary, but the breakdown in political dialogue between the EU and NATO means that our military commanders are continually frustrated by this fundamental flaw whereby our men and women serving the same nation's armed forces cannot communicate with each other. I say to the Minister that this simply cannot go on. I want to examine longer-term defence issues. Last year was 10 years after the St. Malo accord between President Chirac and Prime Minister Blair, and this year is 10 years since the inception of the European security and defence policy. It is clear, particularly to France and the United Kingdom, that the ESDP is not "défense Europe". Common foreign and security policy under the EU banner is not collective European defence. It is not and cannot be, under either the existing treaties or the Lisbon treaty, the strategic defence pact that protects our continent or projects the foreign policy of France, the UK or any of the other major nations of the EU. Nor can it be the vehicle for Europe's contribution to the security of our continent or our collective contribution to the Atlantic alliance. I do not wish to deny the achievements of the ESDP or the useful role that it plays in both conflict prevention and crisis management, but I do not believe that its role is simply in civilian operations either. It has a key role to play in military as well as civil operations—in peacekeeping and peace enforcement, and in challenging threats to our security and that of our friends. The operations in Bosnia, Congo and Chad and the current anti-piracy mission off Somalia are testament to that. Interestingly, the two current EU military operations are both commanded by British commanders. However, the ESDP is not, in its current form, the European pillar of the Atlantic alliance, nor is it capable of defending us against any significant external threat or of projecting the foreign policy objectives of member states. Let us be clear: the French Republic wishes to project its own foreign policy objectives, as do the United Kingdom Government. One tool available to each of those nations is its armed forces, including their respective nuclear deterrents. Their defence policy is an extension of their foreign policy. As Europeans, we hope and pray that our foreign policy objectives are not in conflict. In fact, we devote a considerable amount of time and effort to arriving at common positions, and we earnestly wish that from time to time they should be common European positions. We do so not in opposition to our major ally, the United States, but in our own interests as partners of the United States. In military terms, we should do so as the European pillar of the alliance. Those are our aspirations, but as a continent as a whole we fail quite miserably to deliver. In the 21st century, the largest economic bloc in the world should not depend on the United States. It should be allied to it and an equal partner to it, and it should be able to defend itself and look after the security of its own region. That position is pro-NATO and pro-Europe. It is a challenge, but as British politicians we should be talking to the French, because between us we spend 60 per cent. of the defence budget of the EU. We together could form the core of a "défense Europe", but in both our countries our aspirations go beyond our budgetary capabilities. We must co-operate, and we must bring our European partners with us. Collectively we have the technology, the manpower and the industrial skills. It is not a choice between NATO and the EU—we are in both. It is a matter of whether we want to continue to project our values to a wider world through our foreign and defence policy. We can do that only if we work together. My point is simple. It is now generally accepted that the ESDP is not, and cannot be, European defence. If in the long run, in these difficult economic times, we are to continue to have the ability to project foreign policy through our armed forces, and if we are to cajole and coerce our European partners into making a significant and fair contribution to the alliance and to our common defence, that will not come from Brussels. It will not be an EU initiative. The UK and France are medium-sized powers—just. If that is to continue, they will have to work together and bring with them sometimes recalcitrant European partners. The alternative is that China, India and Russia will overtake us in influence and we will for ever be dependent on the United States for our defence capability. We are perfectly capable of providing that capability for ourselves, and we owe that to the alliance, to the United States and to the British people.