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Nimrod Review

My Lords, before I repeat the Statement today, I declare a past interest as a non-executive director of both the Defence Logistics Organisation and the Defence Procurement Agency and, when those two organisations combined, as a non-executive director of Defence Equipment and Support. I can assure noble Lords that I was not personally involved in any decisions relating to the matter before us today and I have no interest, pecuniary or otherwise, to declare in respect of the report. I am sure that the whole House will wish to join me in offering sincere condolences to the families and friends of the two soldiers of the 3rd Battalion The Rifles who were killed in operations in Afghanistan recently. With the leave of the House, I shall now repeat a Statement made in another place by my right honourable friend the Defence Secretary. The Statement is as follows: "Mr Speaker, seven weeks ago I addressed this House about Mr Charles Haddon-Cave’s report into the events leading to the loss of 14 service personnel aboard Nimrod XV230 on 2 September 2006. As I said then, it was a tough read. It spelt out in detail the many failings both in the MoD and in industry that led to that tragedy. I wish again to express my sorrow for what happened that day and to reiterate my sincere apologies to the families of those who died. I know that nothing that I can say will bring these 14 men back. What we must do now is learn all the lessons and take all the actions necessary to implement them. Mr Haddon-Cave’s investigations were wide-ranging. His report was thorough and detailed. I want to thank him again for his efforts and for helping us to identify the changes that we need to make. Today I am setting out to the House how we are implementing his recommendations. Some of them are complex. I am therefore placing in the Library of the House a more detailed written response to the 84 recommendations. This afternoon I want to focus on three areas: the creation of a new Military Aviation Authority; the changes that we are making to the management of airworthiness; and our relationship with industry. The Nimrod XV230 was lost as a result of a number of failings in the MoD and industry over a period of some three decades. Opportunities to discover and avoid the dangers, particularly during development of the safety case, were missed. In part this was due to specific errors. It was also because the MoD’s aviation safety processes had become too cumbersome, complex and lacking in transparency and accountability. Despite the efforts of many hard-working men and women in the MoD and the private sector to deliver safe aircraft, the result was simply not good enough. The report recognised and, indeed, welcomed the many improvements that we have made since the loss of XV230, but it also made it clear that we needed to go much further. I agree and I am today announcing the most radical reform to the MoD’s approach to airworthiness procedures since military aviation began. First, we are creating a new independent Military Aviation Authority, which will regulate, audit and assure all military aviation activity. It will be led by a senior, three-star military officer, supported by a staff of around 250 personnel. He will provide the leadership for airworthiness and independent assurance that we and our industry partners are all operating to the highest safety standards. He will have been identified and appointed by February and the new authority will begin its work from April next year. The MAA will be independent of those who fly and maintain our aircraft day to day, ensuring that they operate fully within the regulations and are properly equipped, trained and resourced to deliver safe aircraft to the services. In proposing this new organisation for the management of airworthiness, Mr Haddon-Cave wanted to ensure responsiveness in the face of changing operational circumstances and that a safe approach was adopted at all times. I agree, but to make his recommendations effective in the military environment some adjustments are necessary. The single service assistant Chiefs of Staff must retain responsibility for determining that our aircraft can be safely released into service. The MAA will provide full assurance but will not carry out the release-to-service role directly. For operational emergency clearances, I have decided to opt for a tighter regime than Mr Haddon-Cave proposed, under which the assistant chiefs, not those who fly the aircraft at the front line, will be responsible for these clearances. The MAA will play an assurance role in this area, too. This refinement to the Haddon-Cave model will deliver his intent while retaining operational agility and improve on both our current and his proposed governance arrangements. Mr Haddon-Cave also recommended a new approach to aviation safety cases. He was critical of our current approach, saying that it was bureaucratic and missed the point. I agree. We need to make it simpler and more relevant. The MAA will rewrite our instructions to include the improvements that the report recommends. I have instructed that we examine how to apply this best practice appropriately across the whole of defence. We are also auditing the standards of our current aviation safety cases to check that they are fit for purpose. The majority of this work has already been completed and will be finalised in the next couple of weeks. I turn to the criticism of our relationships with industry. My department has been working with BAE Systems and QinetiQ to address their failings identified in the report. BAE Systems has announced the appointment of Dr Chris Elliott to provide independent support to the group managing director in undertaking a review of the company’s approach to product safety. QinetiQ has appointed Sir Robert Nelson QC to oversee the company’s formal investigation, which will include a review of processes, structure and reporting. All their findings will be shared with us. Partnership with industry has always been a part of ensuring that our troops are provided with the best possible equipment and support. We recognise that partnership does not mean that we can just transfer work to industry; we still have a role to play. That is why we are improving the skills of our people to ensure that we manage industry’s activities on our behalf more effectively. A review of the contract conditions that we put in place with industry is also being conducted. We will institute improved checks and audits by the MAA on industry compliance. However, I acknowledge that we need to do more, so I have asked my noble friend Lord Drayson, as part of his work on the defence acquisition reform project, to establish a much clearer understanding of the different roles and interests of industry and the MoD and to be sure that industry’s efforts meet our needs. In his report, Mr Haddon-Cave also criticised the personal conduct of a small number of civilians and service people who held positions in the MoD and in industry in the period leading up to 2006. A number of those individuals work for BAE Systems or for QinetiQ, both of which are conducting their own investigations. A number of others are now retired. In relation to the two serving RAF officers who were named, neither officer currently holds a position in any way related to safety. An RAF police investigation is now under way. Honourable Members will understand that I am unable to comment further on these matters at present. There is an expectation that, in some situations like this, investigations are accompanied by blameless suspensions of the individuals under investigation. We will look again at this to develop a common practice for all MoD personnel, military and civilian. Mr Haddon-Cave’s analysis and conclusions on safety management in aviation have wider relevance and we are looking to see what changes we may need to make across other safety domains in defence. He made a number of broader observations on areas that were not the main focus of his report. Mr Haddon-Cave did not take evidence on the department’s approach to change management. However, I will ensure that his observations on these important issues are reflected in our planned work on the organisation and culture of the MoD and as part of the preparations for a future defence review. Every effort is being made by my department to ensure that our Armed Forces have the best training and the best equipment, but we must recognise that the work of defence is inherently dangerous. We ask our Armed Forces to place themselves in harm’s way and this entails risk. At the same time, any organisation that wants to learn and improve must change and develop. Our Armed Forces cannot stand still in the face of developing threats and the need to work in hostile environments. It is also vital that we do everything possible to use public money effectively and efficiently. However, I am clear that change and development and the management of risk are not, and cannot be, incompatible with a clear commitment and approach to safety. My honourable friend the Minister of State for the Armed Forces and I have been clear throughout that the Ministry of Defence will be open and honest about our shortcomings and will respond vigorously to face the challenge to improve our performance. I regret enormously the death of those on the XV230 and apologise for the part that my department played in failing to prevent that. The measures that I have announced today reflect my personal commitment to improving the safety of military aviation and the safety of our Armed Forces".