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Nimrod Review

My Lords, I thank both noble Lords for their responses, particularly to the extent to which I think that they support the creation of the MAA and the changes that that brings about. I will therefore not go into too much detail on their questions, but pick on some particular points. BAE and QinetiQ received the report at the same time as the House, when it went into the public domain. In the circumstances, it is entirely reasonable that it would take a number of months to respond to it. I understand the expectation is that there will be a response reasonably early in the next year. I am afraid that I cannot comment on the report or on the comments about other officers. We are content that evidence was provided for the report’s recommendations. Therefore, we have dealt with all the recommendations in full and have set out in our written response what we are doing about the recommendations we are accepting, the ones we partly accept and the ones we are rejecting, even the ones we are rejecting that have in many ways been modified. An RAF Police investigation is being conducted into the actions of the two serving officers. It would be inappropriate to comment further on them or on the retired personnel. For that reason, no matter how hard I am pressed, I will make no further comment on that issue or on the extent and depth of the police investigation. The organisational trauma and the importance of ministerial responsibility are clearly accepted in the Statement. However, I am happy to reiterate that today. The Secretary of State acknowledged in October and today that Nimrod XV230 was lost as a result of a number of failings in the MoD and industry over three decades. This was due to specific errors and to the fact that the MoD’s aviation safety procedures had become too cumbersome and complex. We are therefore accepting recommendations made by Mr Haddon-Cave in regard to these specific failings in order to improve military airworthiness. The broader pursuit of savings within defence did not cause the crash, but may have contributed to related failings. Mr Haddon-Cave’s observation regarding savings and change will be reflected in our work on the forthcoming defence review and in the work being undertaken to reform defence acquisition. The noble Lord, Lord Lee, touched on the formation of the MAA and sought a debate in the House on that. I am afraid I have to give the standard ministerial response that that is a matter for the usual channels. However, the MAA is an important organisation. He asked why a serving officer should be involved. Having been involved in safety critical environments, I can see why there may be some attraction in that. Given the complex, technical nature of aviation safety—I am also familiar with that—I think, on balance, one has to recognise that you need somebody who is up to speed with that environment. Therefore, it is difficult to imagine anybody but a serving officer being involved. That concern is reflected in the safety structure of the Ministry of Defence under the new regime. The MAA will not report to the Chief of the Air Staff but to the Second Permanent Under-Secretary, who holds responsibility for defence safety. Within the structure of the Ministry of Defence, it is, I think, an organisation which is as independent as is reasonably practical while being—