---

Strategic Defence and Security Review

My Lords, it gives me great pleasure to open this debate on the strategic defence and security review. First, I am sure that the whole House will wish to join me in offering sincere condolences to the family and friends of Senior Aircraftman Scott Hughes of 1 Squadron, Royal Air Force Regiment, who died in Cyprus on his way back to the UK from Afghanistan. At this time of remembrance, when the nation keeps covenant with those who have made the ultimate sacrifice by giving their lives in action, I am sure that I speak for the whole House in recognising the exceptional job that our Armed Forces do, wherever they are in the world, on behalf of our nation. This is an important debate, as the length and the quality of the speakers list recognises. My aim today is to explain the principles that underpinned the SDSR, and to outline our plans to take forward the huge amount of work that it has generated. That is because the SDSR is the start, not the end, of a process that will give us the Armed Forces that we need to face the challenges of the future while meeting the demands of today. Much that has been said about the SDSR is reminiscent of previous reviews: that we should have taken more time; that finances should somehow be left out of the equation; that it was not strategic. The process began before the election with a Green Paper—a cross-party effort—that formulated some of the key questions and issues that would have to be addressed. The position that we found the country in did not allow us the luxury of conducting the SDSR at a leisurely pace. The Treasury would have had to decide our financial allocation for the comprehensive spending review period on a more or less arbitrary basis. The SDSR faced some perennial issues—not least the difficulty of predicting the future—but some things are unique to this review, which is the first fundamental rethink in 12 years. We had to acknowledge: that our Armed Forces are fighting hard in Afghanistan; that we are in the midst of the biggest financial crisis in a generation; that we inherited a national debt that was growing at a rate that could fund three Type 45 destroyers per week; and that security and defence are indivisible these days. On top of this, we had to reach our conclusions without damaging essential capability, the military covenant or critical industrial capability. We all wish that we could have started with a clean sheet of paper, without the shackles of existing contractual or operational commitments and without the financial pressures facing the Government and the nation as a whole. If we had, the results would undoubtedly have been different. Yet, if we learned anything from the Cold War, it is that our national security requires a strong economy, which in turn requires us to tackle the deficit and bring the defence budget back into balance. The new national security strategy sets out the policy framework and for the first time prioritises security risks and tasks. Under an overarching ““adaptable posture””, the SDSR provides the right capabilities and structures to respond to the highest-priority risks over the next five years, and it begins the transformation of our Armed Forces and security services to meet the challenges of the future. We specifically rejected a ““Fortress Britain”” posture or one that assumed that the wars of tomorrow would inevitably be like the wars of today—although it would be equally foolish to ignore the lessons of history. The adaptable posture demands that our Armed Forces become a more flexible and agile force with global reach. Given the priority that we attach to national security, the defence budget is making a more modest contribution to deficit reduction relative to many other government departments. It has been very difficult, but the SDSR protects the mission in Afghanistan and sets a path to a coherent and affordable defence capability in 2020 and beyond—our twin priorities. Let me take those issues in turn starting with Afghanistan. Afghanistan is the top foreign policy priority for the Government and remains the main effort for defence. There is still some way to go before the Afghans are ready to take responsibility for their own security, but we believe that we have the right strategy. Steady progress is being made. This House, and indeed the people of this country, can be proud of what our brave men and women are achieving. We have protected front-line units and the equipment that they need. Where proposed changes in the SDSR had implications for operations, we have ensured that the success of the mission took precedence. Our other priority was to chart a course to future force 2020 and beyond, which is why I stress that the SDSR marks the start, not the end, of that process. We will focus our work on two five-year phases. The first period, from now until 2015, is necessarily a period of rebalancing the strategic direction. We must tackle the unfunded liability in the defence programme, live within our means as the deficit is addressed and focus our efforts on Afghanistan. We must also recover those capabilities damaged or reduced as a result of years of operational overstretch. The second period, from 2015 to 2020, will be about regrowing capability and achieving our overall vision. It will include the reintroduction of a carrier strike capability, with the Joint Strike Fighter and an escort fleet including the Type 45 destroyer and, soon after 2020, the Type 26 global combat ship. We will also reconfigure the RAF fast-jet fleet around Typhoon and JSF, and consolidate the multirole brigade structure of the Army. Throughout this decade, we will reduce the number of equipment types used to provide the same or similar capability, because doing so reduces costs overall when the complex training and support requirements that each individual piece of kit requires is taken into account. It is our strong belief, shared by the Prime Minister, that the structure that we have agreed for 2020 will require year-on-year real-terms growth in the defence budget beyond 2015. We will also maintain an autonomous capability to sustain a considerable and capable military force on an enduring basis, if required, for both intervention and stabilisation operations. That means that we will be able to conduct enduring operations with a force of 6,500 with enablers and, for a limited time in a one-off intervention, a force of some 30,000 with maritime and air support. That represents a substantial level of effort not so very different from today and shows how our measures in the SDSR limit the impact on the kinds of force that we can deploy. Let me illustrate how we put our principles into practice. First, the adaptable posture is consistent with our deterrent posture, as both allow flexibility, and it recognises that the threat environment could well change in the decades ahead. That is why the Government are committed to the maintenance of the UK’s minimum effective nuclear deterrent. We will proceed with the renewal of Trident and the submarine replacement programme while incorporating the changes set out in the value-for-money study published in the SDSR. This programme does not in any way alter the continuous nature and credibility of the nuclear deterrent. The adaptable posture also means that we will be investing in new technology and capabilities more suited to the likely character of future conflict while reducing our stockholdings and capabilities that have less utility in today’s world, such as heavy armour and non-precision artillery. However, we will maintain the ability to regenerate capabilities that are not needed now if threats change. We have taken less risk against those capabilities that are more difficult to regenerate, such as submarines, and we have retained capability where it fills a capability gap with our allies, such as British mine-hunting capabilities. Secondly, because of our commitment to Afghanistan, we have made no changes to combat units involved in operations there, and we have postponed changes in other key capabilities, such as the RAF’s Sentinel ground surveillance aircraft, for as long as they are required there. That is in addition to the enhancements planned in capabilities such as counter-IED, protected vehicle surveillance and remotely piloted aircraft. Thirdly, a key part of developing future force 2020 is taking difficult decisions now that will allow us to get there. Take the Harrier. Regrettably, we have decided to retire HMS ““Ark Royal”” three years early and retire the Harrier force—both next year. We are looking forward to taking delivery of the future aircraft carriers and the carrier-variant JSF towards the end of the decade. Until we do, we are confident that we can meet our commitments with the UK’s expeditionary air capability delivered by other means. That situation is not unprecedented. Noble Lords will recall that the UK’s carrier strike capability was gapped during the late 1970s, as we transitioned from Buccaneer to Harrier. While Harrier was operating in Afghanistan between 2004 and 2009, our ability to generate carrier strike was severely curtailed. We have agreed that, over the next five years, life-saving combat air support to operations in Afghanistan has to be the overriding priority. However, the bottom line was that salami-slicing the Harrier and the Tornado fleets would not save the required money nor provide the required capability. A decision was therefore needed about which fleet to cut, and military advice was sought. The military advice, which Ministers accepted, was to retain Tornado. We were advised that operations in Afghanistan have taken their toll on the Harrier force and that, because of the cuts made in the Harrier fleet last year, Harrier numbers have been reduced far below the minimum needed to maintain our fast-jet contribution in Afghanistan on an enduring basis and without breaching harmony guidelines. Therefore, we could not sustain our current fast-jet requirement in Afghanistan using Harriers alone. Crucially, we were advised that the Tornado was the more capable aircraft to retain, due to its wider capabilities and force size, not only for Afghanistan but other significant contingent capabilities. In contrast, short-range carrier-based Harriers would provide only a very limited coercive capability beyond 2015. Our judgment was that it was unlikely that this would be sufficiently useful in the second half of the decade. It is true that deleting the entire Tornado fleet would save more money, but that is because we have three times as many Tornado force elements at readiness as Harrier, and Tornado has a longer planned service life. That also surely proves that we have made this decision on the basis of military judgment, not just as a cost-saving exercise. This was a difficult decision to take, but tough and unsentimental choices had to be made. The SDSR is not a cosmetic exercise; it contains many tough but fair choices that are essential if we are to have a coherent and affordable strategy. The campaign in Afghanistan has been protected, and the decisions that we have made will ensure that we maintain our strategic influence and also provide us with the capabilities that we require for the future. Above all, they guarantee that the United Kingdom continues to play a proud and active role in shaping a more stable world.