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Iraq and the Middle East

With permission, I shall make a statement on recent developments in Iraq and across the middle east. Saddam Hussein was removed from power in May 2003. In June 2004, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution setting out the support of the international community for the incoming interim Government of Iraq, for a political process leading to full democratic elections overseen by the United Nations itself, and for Iraq’s reconstruction and development after decades of oppression and impoverishment under Saddam’s dictatorship. In January 2005 the first elections were held for a transitional national assembly, and 7 million people voted. A new constitution was agreed. In December 2005 full parliamentary elections were held, and 12 million Iraqis voted. May 2006 saw the forming of the first fully elected Government of Iraq, an expressly non-sectarian Government including all the main elements of Iraqi society, Shi’a, Sunni and Kurdish. There has been full United Nations backing throughout for the political process and now for the Government of Prime Minister Maliki. Successive United Nations resolutions have given explicit approval for the presence of the multinational force. The political process has thus continued through the years. For example, as we speak the Iraqi Parliament is awaiting the report on amending the constitution from the constitutional review committee, a draft law on de-Ba’athification relaxing some of the restrictions on former Ba’ath party members, and the new hydrocarbon legislation, which will attempt to spread fairly and evenly the proceeds of Iraq’s considerable oil wealth. However, the political process—the reconstruction, reconciliation and everything that the UN has set out as the will of the international community and for which Iraqis have voted—has been thwarted or put at risk by the violence and terrorism that have beset the country and its people. From the day of the appalling terrorist outrage in August 2003, which killed the United Nations special representative and many of his colleagues, to this day, Iraq, and Baghdad in particular, has been subject to a sickening level of carnage, some of it aimed at the multinational force but much of it aimed deliberately to provoke a sectarian struggle between Sunni and Shi’a. The bombing of the shrine at Samarra in February 2006 was designed precisely to provoke Shi’a death squads to retaliate against Sunni. The violence comes from different sources. Some of it originates with former Saddamists; some with Sunnis who are worried that they will be excluded from the political future of Iraq. Many of the so-called spectacular suicide bombings are the work of al-Qaeda, whose grisly presence in Iraq since 2002 has been part of its wider battle with the forces of progress across the world. Now Shi’a militant groups such as Jaish-al-Mahdi are responsible for the abduction and execution of innocent Sunni. These groups have different aims and ideologies, but one common purpose: to prevent Iraqis’ democracy from working. Throughout all the wretched and inexcusable bloodshed, one hope remains. Talk to anyone in Iraq of whatever denomination, whether they are Iraqi or part of the multinational force, whether civilian or military, and they all say the same thing: the majority of Iraqis do not want it to be like this. They voted despite the violence, they know its purpose and its effect and they hate both. There can be legitimate debate about what was right and what was wrong in respect of the original decision to remove Saddam. There can be no debate about the rights and wrongs of what is happening in Iraq today. The desire for democracy is good; the attempt to destroy it through terrorism is evil. Unfortunately, that is not the question. The question is not should we, but can we defeat this evil, and do we have a plan to succeed? Since the outset, our plan, agreed by Iraq and the United Nations, has been to build up Iraqi capability in order to let Iraqis take control of their own destiny, and that as they would step up, we would increasingly step back. For three years, therefore, we have been working to create, train and equip Iraqi security forces capable of taking on the security of the country themselves. In normal circumstances, the progress would be considered remarkable. There are now 10 divisions of the new Iraqi army and more than 130,000 soldiers, able in significant parts of the country to provide order. There are 135,000 personnel in the Iraqi police service. There, the progress has been more constrained, and frequently hampered by corruption and sectarianism, but none the less, again, in normal circumstances, it would be considered a remarkable effort. The plan of General Petraeus, then an army commander in Iraq and now head of the coalition forces there, which was conceived in 2004, has in its essential respects been put in place. But these are not normal circumstances. The Iraqi forces have often proved valiant, but the various forces against them have also redoubled their efforts. In particular, in and around Baghdad, where 80 to 90 per cent. of the violence is centred, they have engaged in a systematic attempt to bring the city to chaos. It is the capital of Iraq. Its strategic importance is fundamental. There has been an orgy of terrorism unleashed upon it in order to crush any possibility of its functioning. It does not much matter if elsewhere in Iraq, not least in Basra, change is happening. If Baghdad cannot be secured, the future of the country is in peril. The enemies of Iraq understand that, and we understand it. So last year, in concert with our allies and the Iraqi Government, a new plan was formulated, and promulgated by President Bush in January this year. The purpose is unchanged. Indeed, there can be only one purpose in Iraq—to support the Government and people of the country to attain the necessary capability to run their own affairs as a sovereign independent state. However, the means of achieving the purpose were adjusted to meet the changing nature of the threat. The Baker-Hamilton report, to which I pay tribute, also informed the strategy. There are three elements to this plan. First, there is the Baghdad security initiative, drawn up by Prime Minister Maliki and currently under way. It aims, as the operation in Basra has done, to take the city district by district, drive out the extremists, put the legitimate Iraqi forces in charge and then make it fit for development with a special fund in place able to deliver rapid improvement. This began last Tuesday. It is far too early to tell its results, although early indications are more promising than what was tried unsuccessfully some months back. In particular, there is no doubt of its welcome among ordinary people in Baghdad. The second part of the plan is a massive effort to gear up the capability of the Iraqi forces, to plug any gaps in command, logistics, training and equipment. Thirdly, there is a new and far more focused effort on reconciliation, reconstruction and development. There are now talks between Iraqi officials and both Sunni and Shi’a elements that have been engaged in fighting. It is again too early to draw conclusions, but this is being given a wholly different priority within the Iraqi Government and by the multinational force. In addition, there have been changes made by Prime Minister Maliki, to whose leadership I again pay tribute, to the way in which economic development and reconstruction moneys are administered within the Iraqi Government, with the Deputy Prime Minister, Barham Salih, given specific responsibility. That will allow the disbursement of funds to be made and will allow, in Baghdad and elsewhere, development and reconstruction to follow closely on the heels of improved security. The objective of all this is to show the terrorists that they cannot win, to show those who can be reconciled that they have a place in the new Iraq, and to show the Iraqi people that, however long it takes, the legitimate Iraqi Government whom they elected, and whom the international community support, will prevail. The aim of the additional US forces announced by President Bush is precisely to demonstrate that determination. If the plan succeeds, then of course the requirement for the multinational force reduces, including in Baghdad. It is important to show—particularly to show the Iraqi people—that we do not desire our forces to remain for any longer than they are needed, but, while they are needed, that we will be at their side. In this context, what is happening in Basra is of huge importance. Over the past months, we have been conducting an operation in Basra, with the 10th division of the Iraqi army, to reach the stage where Basra can be secured by the Iraqis themselves. The situation in Basra is very different from that in Baghdad. There is no Sunni insurgency and no al-Qaeda base. There is little Shi’a on Sunni violence. The bulk of the attacks are on the multinational force. It has never presented anything like the challenge in Baghdad. That said, British soldiers are under regular, and often intense fire from extremist groups, notably elements of Jaish-al-Mahdi. I would like, as I have often done in this House, to pay my profound respect to the British armed forces. Whatever views people have about Iraq, our forces are dedicated, professional, committed and brave beyond belief. This country can be immensely proud of them, and we send again our wholehearted sympathy to the families of those who have fallen and to the injured and their families. As a result of the operation in Basra, which is now complete, the Iraqi forces now have the primary role for security in most parts of the city. It is a still a difficult and sometimes dangerous place, but many extremists have been arrested or have left the city. The reported levels of murder and kidnapping are significantly down. Surveys of Basrawis after the operations have been conducted show a much greater sense of security. Reconstruction is now happening in schools and health centres; in fact, there are about 300 projects altogether. A few days ago, the Deputy Prime Minister, Barham Salih, organised the Basra development forum. He announced a $200 million programme of development and infrastructure in public services. In addition, the international community, with Britain in the lead, has developed projects to increase power supply, put in place proper sewerage systems and increased the supply of drinking water to thousands of homes. The plan to develop Basra port will be published later this year. The problems remain formidable, not least in providing work where for decades 50 per cent. or more of the city’s inhabitants have been unemployed. In an extraordinary development, the Marsh Arabs, driven from one of the world’s foremost ecological sites by Saddam, have been able to resettle there. What all this means is not that Basra is how we want it to be, but it does mean that next chapter in Basra’s history can be written by the Iraqis. I have discussed this with Prime Minister Maliki, and our proposals have his full support and, indeed, represent his wishes. Already we have handed over prime responsibility for security to the Iraqi authorities in al-Muthanna and Dhi Qar. Now in Basra over the coming months we will transfer more of the responsibility directly to Iraqis. I should say that none of this will mean a diminution in our combat capability. The actual reduction in forces will be from the present 7,100—itself down from more than 9,000 two years ago and 40,000 at the time of the conflict—to roughly 5,500. However, with the exception of forces which will remain at Basra palace, the British forces will be located at Basra airbase and be in a support role. They will transfer the Shaibah logistics base, the old state building and the Shatt al-Arab hotel to full Iraqi control. The British forces that remain in Iraq will have the following tasks: training and support to Iraqi forces; securing the Iraq-Iran border; securing supply routes; and, above all, the ability to conduct operations against extremist groups and to be there in support of the Iraqi army when called upon. Over time, and depending naturally on progress and the capability of the Iraqi security forces, we will be able to draw down further, possibly to below 5,000 once the Basra palace site has been transferred to the Iraqis in late summer. We hope that Maysan province can be transferred to full Iraqi control in the next few months, and Basra in the second half of the year. The UK military presence will continue into 2008, for as long as we are wanted and have a job to do. Increasingly, our role will be support and training and our numbers will be able to reduce accordingly. Throughout the whole of that part of the south-east, the UK depends on the steadfastness of our coalition partners: Denmark, Australia, Romania, the Czech Republic and Lithuania. I pay tribute to them. I welcome the continuing Australian role at Tallil in Dhi Qar province. We are keeping in close touch with our allies as the transition proceeds. The speed at which that happens depends partly on what we do and what the Iraqi authorities do, but also on the attitude of those whom we are, together, fighting. Their claim to be fighting for the liberation of their country is a palpable lie. They know perfectly well that if they stop the terror, agree to let the UN democratic process work and allow the natural talent and wealth of the country to emerge, Iraq would prosper and we could leave. It is precisely their intent to eliminate such a possibility. In truth, this is part of a wider struggle that is taking place across the region. The middle east faces an epochal struggle between the forces of progress and those of reaction. The same elements of extremism that try to submerge Iraq—or, for that matter, Afghanistan—stand in the way of a different and better future throughout the region. None of that absolves us from our responsibility. Indeed, for too long, we believed that, provided that regimes were on our side, what they did to their own people was their business. We must never forget that Saddam inflicted 1 million casualties in the Iran-Iraq war and butchered hundreds of thousands of his citizens, including by chemical weapons attack, wiping out whole villages. We need to recognise that the spread of greater freedom, democracy and justice to the region is the best guarantee of our future security as well as the region’s prosperity. That is why peace between Israel and Palestine does not inhabit a different policy domain; it is a crucial part of the whole piece. I shall meet President Abbas later today and also talk to Prime Minister Olmert. In the past 24 hours, I have had detailed discussions with President Bush and Secretary Rice. I shall emphasise again today the importance of basing the proposed national unity Government on the principles of the Quartet. I will also stress our total determination to use the new opportunity to create the chance for peace. I have always been a supporter of the state of Israel and I shall always remain so. However, for the sake of Israel as well as for all we want to achieve in the middle east, we need a proper, well-functioning, independent and viable state of Palestine. We should support all those throughout the region who tread the path of progress, from the Government of Lebanon, whose Prime Minister courageously holds firm to democracy, to those countries—there are many now—that are taking the first, fledgling steps to a different and more democratic governance. As for Iran and Syria, they should not be treated as if they were the same. There is evidence recently that Syria has realised the threat that al-Qaeda poses and is acting against it. However, its intentions towards Iraq remain ambiguous and towards Lebanon, hostile. That statements emanating from Iran are contradictory, but as the words yesterday of the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency show, its nuclear weapons ambitions appear to continue. Both countries, though very different, have a clear choice: work with international community or defy it. They can support peace in Palestine, democracy in Lebanon and the elected Government of Iraq, in which case they will find us willing to respond, or they can undermine every chance of progress, uniting with the worst and most violent elements, in which case they will become increasingly isolated politically and economically. No one should doubt that, whatever the debates about tactics, the strategy must be clear: to bring about enduring change in the middle east as an indispensable part of our own enduring security. The poisonous ideology that erupted after 9/11 has its roots there and is still nurtured and supported there. It has chosen Iraq as the battleground. Defeating it is essential—essential for Iraq but also for us in our country. Self-evidently, the challenge is enormous. It is the purpose of our enemies to make it so, but our purpose in the face of their threat should be to stand up to them to make it clear that, however arduous the challenge, the values that they represent will not win and those that we represent will.