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Iraq and the Middle East

First, it is very important that we do everything we can to protect our troops, who will still face a difficult task—there is no doubt about that at all—in Basra. They will continue, incidentally, with the full combat capability that they have. What they are essentially doing is withdrawing from parts of Basra and doing the patrolling there, but the ability to get after the extremist elements, including the ones that are attacking us, remains undiminished. They will continue to do so. Of course we will ensure that they have the equipment and protection that we can give them. As for the Baker-Hamilton report, let me just explain that it is correct that, because of issues to do with Iran and Syria—I shall come back to them in a moment—it was very much taken as if the Administration’s plan published in January was a rejection of the Baker-Hamilton report, but the elements in it are the only elements that anyone looking into the issue could emphasise. They are building up the Iraqi army, building up the Iraqi governance capability and making sure that those in the region help and support in that process. Both the Baker-Hamilton report and the Administration’s proposals are geared to dealing with gaps in the Iraqi army, which are essentially to do with commander control logistics, training and equipping. General Petraeus is in the process of ensuring that those gaps are dealt with. In respect of the Iraqi Government themselves, it is a lot to do with the actual capability of disbursing the money. For example, there is a lot of money in the Iraqi oil account that could be used for reconstruction. The fact that Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih is now in charge of that will make a big difference. That is important. In relation to the contact group, there is already such a group. The issue is the extent to which Iran and Syria are going to play a constructive role in it. To be absolutely frank about it, some of the debates about what our relationship is with Iran and Syria and whether or not we are dealing with them can seem more contradictory than they really are. Ultimately, the question is this. We are perfectly prepared to deal with Iran and Syria in relation to supporting and helping the situation in Iraq, provided they are prepared to do so. The issue is whether they are prepared to do so. In respect of Syria, I think there is some sign that the Syrian Government are prepared to help. We cannot be sure of this, but there are some tentative signs. In respect of Iran, I have to say, it is perfectly obvious to us—in this sense, we support entirely what the Americans were saying last week—that the ordnance, much of which was used against British soldiers, has an Iranian origin. No one can be sure of the precise degree to which those in the senior levels of the Iranian Government are complicit, but it is certainly very clear that that is the origin of that weaponry. So the issue with Iran and Syria is that we could have any number of groups and they could come to the meetings, but what would they say when they came? Would they help or would they hinder? That is the issue that we need to explore. In respect of Iran’s suspension of its nuclear enrichment, we will try to get a strong united European position. It is clear that, as a result of the measures that have been taken, including the financial sanctions and the sending of the troop carrier, the warship, out there, there has been a change, but we need to keep up the pressure. A very serious and dangerous situation is happening in Iran. On the broad fight against terrorism, there have been all sorts of debates about Guantanamo and extraordinary rendition, and I am not sure that I agree with the right hon. Gentleman—[Hon. Members: ““What?””] Incidentally, it is a matter of fact that the European report about Britain’s involvement in this is simply wrong. If we were to construct a broad alliance against this terrorism, and if I had to single out one, or possibly two, issues to deal with, they would not be to do with rendition or Guantanamo or even some of the things that should never have happened, such as Abu Ghraib, which have obviously been a problem for us too. I would say that the single biggest issue that we should resolve and deal with would be the Israel-Palestine question. We also need to tackle global poverty, particularly in parts of Africa, where, if we are not careful, this same type of extremism is going to take root. If we want a broad moral purpose, those are the two clearest issues that we could address. We must also realise something else about these people. In my view, we will beat them when we realise that it is not our fault that they are doing it. We should not apologise—[Interruption.] No, I am sorry, we should not apologise for our values, for what we believe in or for what we do. The fact is that the values that we stand for are values that can unite Muslim, Christian and Jew, and people of different races and backgrounds, and terrorism will be better defeated if we do not apologise for our values but stand up for them. On the inquiry, I have nothing to add to what I said before. I totally understand that it is sensible to learn the lessons, but we will get to that point when our troops are no longer functioning in a combat situation on the ground.