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Planning Bill

Amendment No. 371A in my name is in this group of amendments but deals with a slightly different subject. I hope that the Committee will bear with me while we yet again go off at a tangent and lose the thread of a very important debate on Clause 116. My amendment relates to Clause 118 on compulsory purchase. As a result of Clause 118, there is a danger that the positive decision to acquire land compulsorily will be seen as a natural consequence of a positive decision in favour of a project on planning grounds. That is worrying because it is contrary to the existing position, where any impediment to the grant of planning permission will weigh against the likelihood of obtaining compulsory purchase powers but the availability of permission does not in itself justify the exercise of compulsory powers. While the Government cite the need for a more streamlined decision-making process for major projects of national importance, no justification has been advanced for treating the affected parties differently in respect of taking or otherwise affecting land. It is important that there is consistency in the treatment of those affected by potential dispossession. That brings me to my amendment, which seeks to delete subsection (2) of Clause 118. The clause deals with the purposes for which land may be compulsorily acquired, and appears to have been pulled together from various Acts, with particular reference to the nature of the projects involved. For these reasons, it is expressed very broadly and provides little guidance on the justification of the use of powers. It is on that guidance that I seek the Minister’s help. It relies on the meaning of the word ““required”” in Clause 118(2)(a), which was used in the compulsory purchase powers provided in Section 226(1)(a) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, along with the requirement that the land should be ““suitable””. The reference to the compelling case in the public interest is a reference to the test applied by the High Court in considering challenges to the confirmation of CPOs. Again, it does not help to establish the justification for exercising specific powers relative to the project under consideration by the decision-maker. A further example of the vagueness of this provision is that there is no indication of the timescale over which the powers may be exercised. As the Minister will know, most similar powers have a life of three years, but hybrid Bills and orders under the Transport and Works Act 1992 may seek longer periods, which will be granted only if justified. The purpose of my amendment, therefore, is to seek more information from the Minister on how this part of Clause 118 will be implemented.