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Queen's Speech

My Lords, I am very honoured to open the batting after that Twenty20 on a rather sticky wicket. We are indeed in very difficult if not dark days, both economically, as the gracious Speech recognised, and strategically, which is rather glossed over. In both areas, errors—some grievous—have been made, which makes progress from the position that we now find ourselves in that much more difficult. In the economic field, the consequences of the errors and omissions were in some cases predictable. In the strategic field, the consequences and fallout from some of the military actions embarked on should have been wholly predictable to anyone with even a cursory knowledge of history and the lessons of the past. As a result of mistakes as to the best way, or at least better ways, of anticipating, containing and progressively countering and eliminating the threat of terrorism, which had been elevated into the highest strategic profile and priority by the 9/11 outrage, we now find our Armed Forces employed in hazardous and costly operations, both in lives and money, without over a sustained period having the manpower, resources—sometimes the equipment; generally they are now very well equipped—and indeed the strategic machinery, if I may put it that way, to deal with these situations as effectively and comprehensively as they demand, and then only with great and continuing stress and stretch to our Armed Forces as a whole. This is despite the estimable leadership, courage, dedication and motivation shown by individual service men and women, which reflect credit on our commanders and the services’ traditional esprit de corps. Heroic efforts have indeed been made but, as yet, there has been too little to show for them in changing hearts and attitudes in the areas concerned. I am not suggesting a withdrawal from Afghanistan in the foreseeable future. These are early days and persistence sometimes brings benefit in wearing down opposition, as it has in other areas. Moreover, politics apart, precipitate action would undoubtedly produce a psychological boost to those who oppose us and would probably damage and set back our longer-term interest in the area. However, we need to keep our uncertain strategy under constant review, clarifying and making more joined up, in military and development terms, the present unsatisfactory command arrangements so that the nations involved can all work to the common plan and tempo. Aid can be better directed and delivered, although that is not happening at the moment, and we can go on trying to improve local relations and not set them back, which area bombing often does. A surge, as apparently advocated by the United States, may seem to improve security in the short term, but such measures are invariably transitory and, with our very meagre resources and current stretch, I hope that we do not follow down that path to any great degree. As the Minister said and as history has shown, more permanent stability can lie only in building up, supporting and paying for local forces, and in developing and delivering constructive and beneficial aid. In tackling terrorism, we should reasonably be in the business of helping friends or potential friends to help themselves but not, I think, essentially in that of imposing an alien political system on those who are perhaps neither ready nor suited to adopt it. Certainly we must continue to work as closely as possible with Pashtun tribal leaders, and if that involves or provides the opportunity to talk to more moderate and reasonable Taliban, well and good. We must somehow get it across that we are there not to conquer and permanently hold Afghan territory, which will always attract resistance, or to kill Taliban just for its own sake but, with the Afghan army, to enforce a measure of security within which all Afghans can benefit from improved infrastructure and speedily delivered and life-improving aid. As the noble Lord, Lord Ashdown, once so aptly put it: "““Breaking up the Taliban by winning over the moderates is a far better route to success than bombing and body counts””." The hope is that a more stable and better way of life will lead, beneficially, to Afghanistan playing a more constructive, socially acceptable and helpful role in the wider international field, and that it will improve vital intelligence against al-Qaeda and enable us to keep our casualties down in what may still be a long haul. From the point that we have arrived at, and if we can make the improvements needed, it is the only way forward, well worth the sustained effort, and, for the moment, very much in the national interest. We have, and indeed we welcome, a new Secretary of State, who would seem to have many qualifications for the job. Apart from his political skills, he is a keen student of, and writer about, military history, which must be an advantage. He appears to be very interested in the assignment and of course he can give these important responsibilities his undivided attention. It will fall to him to act in conjunction with the FCO and those responsible for overseas aid, because this joining-up must start here in Whitehall so that one can get a co-ordinated foreign defence/overseas aid policy. At the moment, it is a bit of a shambles and we need to improve it here, just as we need to improve it on the ground. As has been said, much will depend on the stability and intentions of Pakistan, as well as on the outcome of the presidential election in Kabul. We hope that different attitudes will emanate from Washington which will clarify and improve the strategy and place it on a more regional and partnership basis, which we found essential in the recovery of Kuwait and in handling the various crises in the Balkans. Very serious consideration has to be given to how we can best support Pakistan in any fight against al-Qaeda, which, after all, provides a formidable threat to its security. This will require diplomatic tact and subtlety of the highest nature if pressure on Pakistan to do more is not to be counterproductive. Only recently, for the first time in decades, local traders have been allowed to cross the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir—a concession that appears to have been initiated from Delhi. Can we not seek to build on this and try, even in these delicate times, to improve Indo-Pakistani relations to the extent that the security situation there becomes less tense and so that Pakistan military units may be deployed on the North-West Frontier Province, where they are so badly needed? It may be clutching at straws but we have to do something to give some relief to Pakistan in its problems—not least of course in its traditional, almost obsessive, fears about India’s intentions in the whole area, and to some extent vice versa. The awful outrage in Mumbai has not helped but in fact only emphasises yet again how countries must pull together. Terrorism is, after all, international and countries must work with mutual support if we are to get on top of this problem. Finally, the Secretary of State will also have the difficult task of getting the defence vote into proper balance. The realist may well say that in the present economic climate there will be little, if any, more money for defence, either in theory or in practice. That may be so but, if that is the case, an enormous funding gap of billions of pounds—a veritable black hole—will be revealed between the planned and, at the moment, needed requirements and expected financial resources. Of course, what is badly needed is a defence review to try to bring this country’s proper contribution on the world stage, and therefore its commitment, more into line with the resources that it is prepared to provide on a national basis or can guarantee on a pooled basis with allies. However, with a general election, which cannot be far away, that is most unlikely to happen. In the mean time, a closer look will have to be taken at the higher spending capital costs, which we most certainly cannot afford and which, after closer strategic assessment than they have had so far, we may not even need. I see a dilemma because some of those high-cost capital projects due to be constructed in this country may come into the category of direct government expenditure, designed to blast their way through any recession on a New Deal basis, as well as providing employment in key north-western constituencies. Were they to go ahead on what could be called a priming-of-the-pump basis, irrespective of the strategic urgency and without extra funding for such projects, or at least a decision to delay some of them so far into the future that they do not impinge on the current funding cycle—some noble Lords may think that the successor to Trident could come into that category—it will be impossible to square the circle. If something on those lines is not done, it invariably happens when one continues year after year to squeeze a quart into a pint pot that the accessible items—so many items for defence are inaccessible—fall off the bottom. The front line will continue to lack depth, sustainability and the latest equipment. Vital training for role and the equipment to make it possible will prove inadequate. The normal day-to-day functions of the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force—the air bridge would come into that category—will suffer. Personnel and support areas, such as housing and comprehensive medical care, which are so essential to the improvement of the covenant will once again suffer and become shaming, as has happened in the past five to 10 years. Implementation as opposed to intention of the now generally accepted military covenant and the high morale that it engenders will invariably depend on proper funding of the defence programme as a whole. The two cannot be dissociated. The Secretary of State will have much to engage him if the present defence policy and programmes are to break out of the doldrums and the grip that they are in at the moment.