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Queen's Speech

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Owen, speaks as always with great experience and great authority on Zimbabwe and Afghanistan. I shall start on a somewhat broader note, comparing the mood of today’s debate with the mood of the debate that took place a year ago. The fundamental reflection is that of change—fundamental change—in that mood and in the world picture. It is associated not only with the financial downturn—the crisis—though that is clearly fundamental. The whole landscape has changed, and is likely to change further. In my judgment, there has been a major turning point, probably even a greater turning point than occurred in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall, which affected one part of the world—our Europe—at its core. The financial crisis will directly affect all parts of the world. It will accelerate changes that were already under way, as set out in last month’s very important report by the US National Intelligence Council entitled Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World. In my judgment, that should be recommended reading for all of us as it is the likely context in which we as a country and we as Europeans will have to conduct our foreign policy over the next 15 years. It was a collaborative project, not confined to the US intelligence agencies but bringing in leading think tanks from around the world. The key message was that, yes, there would be these trends in international developments, but if we do not like them we can seek to change them. If we do like them, let us seek to promote them. The summary was clear. It stated: "““The international system—as constructed following the Second World War—will be almost unrecognizable by 2025 owing to the rise of emerging powers, a globalizing economy, an historic transfer of relative wealth and economic power from West to East, and the growing influence of nonstate actors. By 2025, the international system will be a global multipolar one with gaps in national power continuing to narrow between developed and developing countries””," and so on. It is a forecast that is likely to affect us all. It is interesting to compare that intelligence report with the equivalent report four years ago. There are key changes. In its view, the US is no longer the dominant power but the first among equals. Energy supplies are no longer sufficient to meet demand; there will be energy scarcity. There will no longer be a calm position; there will be increasing shocks and risks in the international system, including the nuclear arms race in the Middle East and resource conflicts. That consensus scenario provides challenges for many foreign policy priorities. The second change is, of course, the election of President Obama. Historians will judge the Bush Administration, certainly in international relations, very harshly. But it is not just Iraq. It is also a refusal to use leverage in key areas, the squandering of goodwill after 9/11, the missed opportunities to lead in arms control and climate change, and the often unilateral views tempered somewhat only at the end. Now we have a President-elect who has made change his watchword, but perhaps it has to be defined rather more closely. There is a new prospect of co-operation with allies, a recognition that the US cannot act alone, and a new openness on key issues such as Iraq and Iran. The President will start with great expectations; inevitably, some will be disillusioned. First he will clearly have to deal as best he can with the world economic crisis; then probably with the contingent and the unforeseen, as one great historian called it. I recall what Michael Stewart, then Foreign Secretary, said to me in a very tired way: the thing that worried him was that at any moment of the day two-thirds of the world was awake and capable of causing mischief. Condoleezza Rice is rushing round trying to hold the ring between the two powers of India and Pakistan, so probably any great power can be knocked off balance by the unexpected. Then, of course, Iraq and Afghanistan and Pakistan are, as the noble Lord, Lord Owen, said, intimately linked. Even if the new Administration hit the ground running there will be a great hiatus that we in the European Union can fill, or not, as we choose. How we respond to that hiatus and the new mood in the United States is important to the European Union. I will not repeat what the noble Lord, Lord Patten, said in the article in today’s Le Monde, but there is much wisdom in it. It is a favourable climate. The overactive, or multiactive, President Sarkozy has drafted a letter to the US President. The ghosts of Iraq have largely been exorcised. The key test will probably be provided at the April NATO summit in Strasbourg and Baden-Baden. When we are asked to provide more for Afghanistan, will our resources rise to meet our ambitions? How will we respond with financial resources or manpower to the demand to help tackle the looming greater crisis in Afghanistan? Will we allow the Americans to do the cooking and ourselves only the washing up, providing only the soft power which is also clearly important? The new US national intelligence estimate reveals a bleak picture in Afghanistan, rather different from the picture painted by my noble friend on the Front Bench. The estimate talks of a ““downward spiral”” there, doubts about the ability of that Government to stem the rise in the Taliban’s influence, rampant corruption and the boom within the heroin trade. As the noble Lord, Lord Owen, has said, that calls for new initiatives and a willingness to see if there is a sort of Sinn Fein among the Taliban—a willingness to look at the whole range of policies. Certainly, going by his past record, General Petraeus has the capacity to do that—to recognise that the battle cannot be won just militarily. How will Europe respond? Will the US President enter into direct talks with Iran? Will the European Union, having been the first stage of the rocket, be sidelined? It is clearly significant that when the EU Foreign Ministers met in Marseilles on 3 November, transatlantic relations was the first item on the agenda. Then there was the Middle East peace process, stressing again the regional aspect. Then there is Russia. We in this House recently had a debate on the EU Committee report, so I shall not go over that. Clearly, however, while responding robustly to Russian aggression, we need at least to avoid provocations, which we appear to be doing on NATO enlargement and perhaps on the siting of missile defence elements. Finally, the Democratic Republic of Congo; as so many noble Lords have said, Africa is so often sidelined. The US intelligence report said that, "““sub-Saharan Africa will remain the most vulnerable region on Earth in terms of economic challenges, population stresses, civil conflict, and political instability””." The European Union is best equipped to engage there. Are we prepared to do so? One test will be how we respond to the invitation of the UN Secretary-General to send a military force to North Kivu. I note that the Belgian Foreign Minister, with all that country’s experience, has at present said no. So far I have mentioned the European Union, not the UK. Why? Because we cannot act alone; the Falklands conflict was the last such operation. We need allies and to work together. Obviously, the European Union is where, day by day, we mould our foreign policy at both ministerial and Civil Service levels. This is the 10th anniversary of the Saint Malo initiative. Now there are 12 European Union missions in action over three continents; that is a major change. My concern is that although most sections of this House have recognised that, the Conservative Opposition have not yet done so. Who can forget those years in the 1990s when we in the UK were increasingly isolated in Brussels and unable to punch our weight? Will we have to pay that price again if the Conservatives ever return to government? I urge the leaders of the Conservative Opposition not to rush into the cul-de-sac of the Commonwealth as some sort of alternative to the European Union. There is no country in the Commonwealth which takes that view. It is an illusion and a failure to recognise where our interests lie in the face of those major challenges. The Lisbon Treaty would have been a major bonus for us in streamlining the EU administration and showing a continuity of leadership. One of the European Union’s problems now is that we move over the next six months from the excellent French presidency of President Sarkozy, as shown in the Mediterranean and his initiative over Georgia, to the Czechs, where President Klaus, who is constitutionally responsible for foreign policy, has a totally negative view of the European Union. Without the changes of the Lisbon Treaty that, alas, is part of our problem. In conclusion, we see through a glass darkly, but at least the US intelligence report maps out some of the increasing challenges that we face. There is much promise in President-elect Obama, and much possibility in our allies within the European Union if we are proactive. We have much to gain, mutually, by working together and concerting our policies across the board.