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EU: Russia (EUC Report)

I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, on providing such a good platform for this debate in his introduction. I congratulate him particularly because he inherited the report from his predecessor. My starting point is the first editorial in yesterday’s Financial Times, which was headed: "Talk to Russia, Remember Georgia". That neatly summarises the appropriate response to Russia in the current warmer climate, although there are clearly cooler patches, as the noble Lord indicated. From the heady confrontation of last August during the invasion of Georgia, we are moving towards a more mature relationship with greater recognition of the convergence of interests between the European Union and Russia, but we cannot, as the Financial Times editorial has said, ignore the old concerns. In its first report, the committee’s analysis of relations between the European Union and Russia is generally broadly correct. Both reports were based on evidence from a variety of sources, and, I like to think, provide a useful compendium for those outside Parliament to gain an indication of the subject—something which I thought particularly important when I had the honour of chairing the Foreign Affairs Committee in the other place. Its conclusions are linked to our committee’s report on the European Union security strategy, which we published at the end of last year. Gone are the naive assumptions about Russia in the 1990s, for example that Russia was just like us. We clearly need a deep understanding of Russia’s history and geography. One wag said that history is geography spread over time. There have been quite significant changes since our first report in May last year. That report was correct at the time, but as has been said in another place, an amendment has been moved since then. One amendment is the world recession, which has had an effect on Russia. In the 1930s, after the Wall Street crash, Soviet Russia was largely insulated from the recession at that time. The new globalisation affects Russia too; the fall in oil prices has had a marked effect on Russia’s budget assumptions. Perhaps one can also detect in Russia’s foreign policy a certain reduced arrogance, as was noted in the speech last week of Mr Rogozin, Russia’s ambassador to NATO, and the greater willingness on the part of the Russian Federation to explore areas of co-operation with the West. The second major change was the election of President Obama. Perhaps we were all expecting far too much in this case. I was in Egypt yesterday, and there were enormous expectations of him, not only in the Middle East peace process but in the coming speech on 4 June on relations with the Islamic world. In all parts of the world, there are perhaps unrealistic assumptions about what change means and what we can realistically expect from the new US Administration. It is clear that the new Administration gives high priority to discussions with Russia; one thinks of the speech of the Vice-President at Munich. The signals are very positive in broad terms, even on Afghanistan; although Russia was clearly instrumental in helping to persuade the Kirghiz Government to close the US base, which was a useful conduit for Afghanistan, it has at least partially stepped into the breach, perhaps because it wishes NATO to be dependent on it for its supplies, leaving aside the Khyber Pass. There is a new spirit of co-operation and new opportunity, and unnecessary provocations have been put on hold. Last week I was in Washington where it was clear that, whereas perhaps six months ago we would have been talking about the problems of the siting of missile installations in the Czech Republic and Poland and about NATO expansion to Georgia and Ukraine, those have now been frozen—they are not frozen conflicts, but frozen initiatives. That is a useful change. As the noble Lord has said, we still have the tit-for-tat over spies and there were problems when NATO had its recent well planned military exercises in Georgia, but the indications are positive, particularly in respect of non-proliferation and the preparations for the non-proliferation treaty. The European Union, with regard to our eastern partnership, is perhaps rather less ambitious. There were mixed motives anyway; in part, this was a response to President Sarkozy’s initiative last July in respect of the Mediterranean, an initiative that is meeting broadly the same problems as the Barcelona process. There are continuing areas of concern, as we mentioned in our first report. There is the Russian pressure on Ukraine. We looked particularly at problems of energy security, not only in January this year but in 2005 and 2006, and the fear that Russia, by encircling the European Union, is trying to make us increasingly dependent on Gazprom and Russian energy institutions generally. Certainly, a number of countries in the European Union and those outside it such as Serbia appear to be playing largely to the European game. We said in our report that we hoped that the danger of Russian encirclement and the danger of dependency on Russian gas supplies would lend a new impetus to the Nabucco project. I hope that the Minister will say something about this. Yesterday the press were telling us about an agreement reached last Friday between the European Union and Turkey that, again, is designed to break the stranglehold; it would allow a pipeline to cross Turkey to Azerbaijan and possibly, even later, to go underneath the Caspian to bring in supplies from Turkmenistan. This is important and I hope that my noble friend will say a little more about the agreement with Turkey and its significance. The main change, as the noble Lord who opened this debate said, is that since we produced our report last May, there has been the Russian invasion of Georgia. I shall not talk about the responsibility for that; it is clear that there were Russian military exercises in the area shortly before the invasion, but it is also clear that there were provocations by the Georgian president. We now have a much more nuanced approach to the responsibility, which, we hope, will be made clear in the report to be produced in a few months by the Swiss diplomat who is examining the issue on the ground. Both sides are rather more guarded now, but clearly Russia is in breach of its international obligations in the agreement that was reached between President Sarkozy and President Medvedev last August. Russia has recognised the breakaway provinces and has been joined only by Nicaragua. It has failed to withdraw to the old frontiers prior to the invasion. There is some evidence of ethnic cleansing in South Ossetia, particularly in Abkhazia. There are increased military personnel, more than envisaged in the Medvedev-Sarkozy agreements. The noble Lord has referred to the Russian build-up of the naval base and other military bases in Abkhazia and the barring of access, to a large extent, for EU monitors. This is clearly a major breach by Russia. I recall some years ago reading a learned article by a US academic in foreign affairs who said that he was sitting in his car in Grosvenor Square when he looked up and saw the high point of diplomatic wisdom, which said: "Do not enter box unless your exit is clear". If we apply that to Russia in today's circumstances, it is sad that there is no clear exit. There is no exit strategy for withdrawal from South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Ideally, a diplomat would say that it is our job to provide a ladder down which Russia can climb, but given the developments in those two provinces, the loss of face would presumably be too great and we are likely to be saddled with those areas of insecurity for some considerable time to come. It would be helpful for my noble friend in his reply to tell us our prognosis for Abkhazia and South Ossetia. There is indeed a great deal of thuggery and it is said that there is not a warm relationship between North Ossetia, in the Russian Federation, and South Ossetia. Is it our assumption that Russia will eventually annex those two breakaway provinces and continue its military build-up? What are our aims in the area? Do we realistically expect Russia to withdraw? What is clear is that the Russian invasion of last August and its subsequent activities are very much in breach of and undermine the proposals made by President Medvedev for a new security architecture in Europe, both before and at the time of the Evian conference last September. I concede that the proposals are still very broad, but they involved the recognition of territorial integrity and the inviolability of frontiers. That has clearly been breached by the Georgian invasion. The more worrying section of the Medvedev proposals concerns the special responsibility for Russia and its near abroad and for Russian citizens—particularly when, as in Ukraine and elsewhere, they are producing many new passports for those citizens. I would hope that at the very least, looking at the possibilities in the Crimea and Moldova, there will be renewed emphasis on the part of the European Union and NATO on cauterising or dealing with the frozen conflicts in the near abroad that can further complicate our relations with Russia. In conclusion, we clearly need to work together with Russia. We need to build bridges. We need to build an infrastructure of understanding, both culturally and commercially. Where we can, where there is clear mutuality of interest, we need to work with the Russians—yes, in Afghanistan—in arms control, perhaps the most promising of the areas concerning the Non-Proliferation Treaty; on the technical side of NATO, in bringing new life to the NATO-Russian Council in air-sea rescue and other matters. We need to be ready to consult more and to develop the habit of working together—yes, to mutual benefit, but as the Financial Times editorial said, do not ignore old concerns. Perhaps we should remember the warning of the Lady of Riga.