---

EU: Russia (EUC Report)

It is right that we should have the opportunity again to debate the important issue of the EU’s relations with Russia, even quite soon after our previous debate. Much is happening in that relationship and not all of it is for the good. The hard fact is that the European Union does not have a functioning across-the-board policy towards Russia. Until it does, we shall be easy prey to Russia’s divide-and-rule tactics. I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, and his colleagues on a truly excellent supplement to last year’s report that takes full account of the events in Georgia last August and of the effect of the economic crisis on the Russian economy, and thank them for so generously inviting me to participate in their discussions of it, despite the fact that by then I had moved on to a different part of the European Union Committee’s firmament. First, I have a couple of comments about the Government’s response to this report. They bridle at the suggestion that mixed signals from Washington may have contributed to President Saakashvili’s lamentable decision to try conclusions with the much superior Russian military forces, a decision which, quite rightly in my view, the committee characterises as "reckless". No doubt the president listened to those voices in Washington that were saying what he wanted to hear, and chose to ignore any cautious advice he may have received from the State Department. A simple reading of the American press, however, would show that there were plenty of voices egging him on, and that not all of them were very far removed from the former Administration. The lesson to be learnt is the crucial importance of avoiding loose rhetoric and misleading indicators when dealing with a situation as combustible as that in the Caucasus. Fortunately, the new US Administration seem to have learnt that lesson. A second point on the government response: it was a bit of a pity that the Government missed the opportunity to set out in full the compelling reasons why the analogy drawn by the Russians between the cases of Abkhazia and South Ossetia on the one hand and of Kosovo on the other was self-serving. The Government simply swatted it away without explanation. If one wants to look for such an analogy in recent international relations, one finds it not with Kosovo but with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. There, too, an entity was carved out of a sovereign, independent member of the United Nations whose territorial integrity all had agreed to respect. There, too, military force was used, substantial ethnic cleansing took place and only one country recognised the new entity. The irony is that Russia, and before it the Soviet Union, has always been among the most vociferous critics of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. So when the Russian Foreign Minister waxes eloquent about others’ double standards—he was an old sparring partner of mine in the 1990s, so I am sure that he will not resent what I say—he should perhaps take a glance in the mirror. Kosovo’s autonomy under the old Yugoslav constitution—and these seem to be the bullet points as regards saying that Kosovo is quite different—was unilaterally withdrawn by President Milosevic against the wishes of 90 per cent of its inhabitants. A repressive regime was installed which committed many gross abuses of international humanitarian law. Now, the new constitution of an independent Kosovo guarantees the rights of the Serb and other minorities—not something that is noticeable in the Abkhaz or South Ossetian constitutions, if they have them. More than 50 countries have recognised Kosovo’s independence. That is quite a contrast, I should have thought. Clearly, as the noble Lord, Lord Crickhowell, and others have said, energy will be at the heart of any relationship between the EU and Russia, now and for the foreseeable future. It is here that the EU has so far lamentably failed to get its act together. The consequences were there for all to see during last January’s stand-off between the Ukraine and Russia over gas supplies. The remedies are not difficult to identify: a more unified and more competitive internal energy market, the building of interconnectors between the gas supply pipelines of different member states, the diversification of the EU’s sources of external supply and of the pipeline networks leading westward into Europe, and the ability to speak to Russia with a single voice. One further remedy seems to receive too little attention; and I was delighted to hear the noble Lord, Lord Crickhowell, who knows much more about these matters than I do, giving it a good deal of emphasis: the establishment of much more extensive gas storage facilities throughout Europe. After all, there are EU obligations on member states to hold a minimum supply of oil for facing the event of a supply interruption. Why do we not have similar obligations for gas, which is even more vulnerable to interruptions? I was glad to see in the Government’s reply to the report that this issue is to be looked at during the course of the year. Will the Minister say what line the Government will take during that review? Will he assure us that they want to see an increase in gas storage capacity, including in this country? It is also important not to present the case for an EU policy on energy and energy security as simply an anti-Russian gambit. That would be quite foolish. No conceivable amount of diversification of supplies, development of renewables and nuclear or increases in energy efficiency will rid us of a considerable long-term need for supplies of Russian oil and gas, just as no amount of Russian development and diversification of its overseas markets will rid it of a considerable dependence on the EU market for its oil and gas exports. So we need to learn to get on better together and to co-operate in this area, which is of obvious mutual advantage. It is entirely legitimate and indeed highly desirable for the European Union to reduce its present vulnerability to a single supplier, but not in doing so to ignore our interest in a better long-term relationship with that supplier. Perhaps the Minister could say something about progress in the negotiations for a new agreement between the EU and Russia and whether it will cover these vital energy issues. No recent development in Russian foreign policy arouses more concern than President Medvedev’s so far fairly vague references to Russia having a "sphere of influence" or "privileged relations" with the countries of the former Soviet Union. Russian actions in Georgia and the handing out of Russian passports to many citizens of these countries have only added to that concern. Are we to interpret this as a mere passing manifestation of post-imperial nostalgia, an affliction with which we have had some familiarity ourselves, or is it something more sinister and dangerous? Whichever it is, surely we must neither collude with it nor condone it. The 21st century has no place for such pre-First World War concepts, which in any case ended in disaster for all concerned. The European Union is surely right to pursue its Eastern Partnership with those countries, but must ensure at the same time that nothing is done behind Russia’s back and that the fullest consultation takes place at every stage in the development of those relations. The picture of EU-Russia relations is one that presents opportunities but which also has plenty of clouds hanging over it. President Obama’s decision to try to reset relations between the US and Russia, and the recent reopening of bilateral negotiations on strategic nuclear arms, is such an opportunity since the interconnections between EU and US relations with Russia can hardly be in doubt. However, we need a clear European strategy and a will to implement it if we are to put the opportunities on offer to good use, and that strategy so far is lacking.