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Equality Bill

My Lords, the first amendment to paragraph 2 of Schedule 9 from my noble friend Lady Turner would add to this exception wording from the relevant provision of the European directive that underlies the exception: namely, Article 4(1) of the framework directive. Member states are not required to copy the wording of the directive; they have only to achieve its intended result, which is what this exception does. Its wording is not materially different from the existing exceptions that it replaces and harmonises, one of which, Regulation 7(3) of the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003, was held to be compatible with the directive by the High Court in the Amicus case. I hope that that will help to reassure my noble friend that the additional wording is unnecessary. Paragraph 2(6) expressly refers to the "nature" or "context" of the employment, which includes an appointment to a personal or public office but which is narrower than the expression "particular occupational activities" used in the directive. The words "genuine and determining" in the amendment would not add anything to the natural meaning of the word "requirement". The question whether being of a particular sex, for example, is or is not a requirement for a particular post will be a matter of fact to be determined in the circumstances of each case. If a requirement is not genuine, the facts will show that. If it is not determining, by definition it cannot be a requirement. As paragraph 2(1) requires the employer to show that the employment to which a requirement is applied is, ""for the purposes of an organised religion"," it is not necessary to state that the requirement is "occupational". Finally, the exception specifies in paragraph 2(5) and (6) the two narrow objectives of complying with the doctrines of the religion and avoiding conflict with a significant number of the religion’s followers’ strongly held religious convictions. These are both legitimate objectives, and in the Amicus case the High Court thought it clear that a requirement that meets either of the conditions pursues a legitimate aim. Amendment 32, which is my noble friend’s second amendment to paragraph 2 of Schedule 9, would add, ""a requirement related to religion or belief"," to the requirements to which paragraph 2(4) applies. All the requirements listed in paragraph 2(4) relate to religion or belief in that they reflect matters of religious doctrine. For example, the Roman Catholic Church requires its priests to be men and unmarried. If an organisation with a religious ethos wishes to require an employee to be of a particular religion or belief, it could seek to rely on the specific exception at paragraph 3 of Schedule 9. I therefore hope that I will be able to reassure my noble friend on this. I also make it clear that, notwithstanding the outcome of the votes on various amendments to this exception in Committee, the law will remain as it is. As my right honourable friend the Minister for Women and Equality put it, ""in anti-discrimination law there is an exemption for religious jobs but not for non-religious jobs".—[Official Report, Commons, 4/2/10; col. 468.]" For all those reasons, I ask my noble friend to withdraw her amendment.