Proceeding contribution from Lord Chidgey (Liberal Democrat) in the House of Lords on Monday, 20 November 2006. It occurred during Queen's speech debate on Debate on the Address.
Debate on the Address
My Lords, the Minister will be aware that the Government’s White Paper, Active Diplomacy for a Changing World: The UK’s International Priorities, is currently the subject of scrutiny in the Foreign Affairs Select Committee in another place. I am sure he is also aware that it has been suffering rather intensive and vicious criticism as part of that process. On the other hand, some may quite like it. Nevertheless, in the face of the criticism, I would be grateful if the Minister would clarify in due course what the Government hope the White Paper will achieve. For example, is it intended to provide benchmarks to measure outcomes against best practice—a sort of monitoring methodology? Is it, as the title suggests, intended to enable the Government to respond more quickly and effectively to events? That being the case, we are rather spoilt for choice in selecting areas where we would benefit from some active diplomacy in a changing world, in pursuit of our international objectives. The immediate case in point must surely be the impact of the mid-term elections in the United States, which reach far beyond their domestic policies. This I can vouch for, having just spent the weekend at the President Clinton Centre in Little Rock, Arkansas. While my noble friend Lord Ashdown was in Washington, I was in the deep South, listening to a different point of view. Having listened at length to the views of governors, house speakers and representatives from the state legislatures from over 25 states across the Union, it is clear that the mid-term elections have been a wake-up call across America. But the effect goes deeper: right down into the grass roots of local politics, the wholesale defeat of mainly incumbent Republican Party politicians and elected officials down to the lowest level in the smallest towns of America has sent a shock wave through the political establishment. One state governor described the results as a tsunami—a blue wave that swept over the republican political landscape and swept away the party’s political infrastructure. The impact on our interests is twofold: broadly, cause and effect. In Little Rock, national pollsters, party analysts and campaign directors demonstrated beyond doubt that the cause of this massive swing, in US terms, was the war in Iraq: the manner in which it had been justified, the way it had been conducted and the apparent lack of any clear plan to achieve the goals set out of democracy, security and stability in that country. The post-election studies have shown that those factors unleashed a degree of voter frustration, disbelief, anger and rejection against the incumbents that has rarely, if ever, been witnessed in mid-term elections in America. In due course, the reaction of the American public to the Iraq war may well have similar parallels in the United Kingdom. In the context of this debate, however, it is the effect of the unpredicted result of these elections on our foreign policy priorities and on the ““special relationship”” that is at issue. It was always going to be the case that cementing our ties with the United States in a joint approach to the war in Iraq, the war against terrorism and despotic regimes in both Iraq and Afghanistan would have an effect on our influence elsewhere, particularly within the European Union and throughout the Middle East. The Government’s justification for that seems to have been that the special relationship would bring with it extra UK influence on the United States, as a bonus or a sort of reward. It beggars belief, therefore, that in spite of the Foreign Office’s unique insight, stretching back to the end of the First World War, into the make-up of Iraq and the political and ethnic realities of the region—we are talking about nearly 100 years of experience—the Government failed to persuade their US counterparts of the action needed to prevent a descent into chaos when the Ba’athist regime was removed. It may well be that our counterparts in the US Department of State were persuaded, but were powerless to wrest the initiative from the Pentagon and Department of Defense. All the more reason for the Government to pull back from the brink, instead of plunging on down into what has become a diplomatic and foreign policy disaster. The outcome of the US mid-term elections puts another twist in the tale of our ambition to deliver active diplomacy in a changing world. After the ““thumpin’”” received by the Administration, the message from Little Rock was pretty clear. The two years up to the presidential elections in 2008 will be spent concentrating on defending its incumbency—against the odds, it would appear. With disapproval of the Iraq war running so high, some American pundits now believe it unlikely that a significant US military presence will remain in Iraq beyond the end of 2007. Already there are signs of US land forces reducingin scale—““trending down””, as they put it—in Afghanistan, and a greater reliance being placed on air strikes. It is a political reality that the shock of the mid-term election result is likely to lead to a reduction in exposure of the Bush Administration to further damage from further military setbacks. So where does this leave our foreign policy priorities, which for several years have been locked into US ambitions? However well-meaning Jim Baker and his team may be in setting out a new way forward in the Middle East, the reality is that the aggressive rhetoric aimed at the Iranian leadership, which was also for home consumption, merely played into the hands of the extremist leaders of that country. Applying labels such as ““axis of evil”” and ““rogue state”” and publicising options for pre-emptive ““surgical strikes”” allow the despots to reinforce the claimed threat from the US and her allies, and the need to defend their people from it. It was made very clear to me in Iran not long ago that the collective memory of events in the 1950s—planned, I understand, by United Kingdom agencies, and carried out, I understand, by American agencies—that led to the installation of the Shah in power is still very strong in Iranian minds, and it colours their view of our intentions even today. I doubt very much that they will be receptive to a statement from Baker’s team to the effect of, ““Oh, we have changed our minds””. We are America’s strongest allies, but we need to use our best efforts somehow to persuade the Administration and those that may follow them not to revert to the traditional isolationist view of the world when domestic politics go wrong, but to work with and to accept the various shades of interests that we and western democracies share with them, towards achieving a common good. Perhaps I may put that task in perspective. Five years ago, when I was visiting Washington and New York quite regularly with the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and his team, we regularly met Americans in the street. Everyone I met talked of our Prime Minister as if he were a long-lost brother, newly reunited and found by the family. Yesterday in Little Rock, the mention of our Prime Minister’s name was met with silence.
Secondary information
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- Proceeding contribution
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- 687 c150-3
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- 2006-07
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- Defence Climate change Developing countries Development aid Africa Iraq Foreign policy Nuclear weapons Peacekeeping operations Procurement Proliferation Terrorism United Nations Afghanistan NATO Israel Islam Palestine Iran Middle East Reconstruction Peace negotiations EU defence policy North Korea al Qaeda Taliban
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- View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk
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