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Debate on the Address

My Lords, many noble Lords have so ably made the point, with which I agree, that for the past five years we have not really had a coherent strategy in the Middle East, only a drifting forward from crisis to crisis as American actions and political expediency demanded. Iraq, however it has had to be presented politically, has been the gravest of disappointments, if not largely a predictable disaster. It has exacerbated, not diminished, the problem of terrorism; disrupted the balance of power to the gain of Iran; lost us much goodwill and trust in the Arab world, to which we might previously have laid claim; above all, it has taken everyone’s eyes off the ball of the one critical issue which more than any other might bring stability to the area—a fair and just solution to the Palestine problem. If that is repetition, it cannot be said often enough. Most people accept that we should leave Iraq as soon as we decently can—the Prime Minister adding the rider ““when the job is done””—but it is not easy to know how the completion of that job, however it is represented, can be assessed in a realistic time frame. Now the options left to us are few, and all carry high risks. Of course we must try to involve and work with other states in the area, whose interests cannot be served by a chaotic Iraq; but there may not be too many anxious to come forward to sort out a mess made by others, particularly while some continue to be dubbed undiplomatically as being on an ““axis of evil””. On top of that, we have the sad spectacle of a campaign in southern Afghanistan—after a more rational and focused intervention in the north—entered into without sufficient forethought or consideration of the history, make-up and therefore inevitable threats in the area, with inadequate numbers on the ground, helicopter support and logistic backing, and all exacerbated by our preoccupation with Iraq and previous underfunding and cuts. It has been only the outstanding professionalism and valour of our Armed Forces, fighting very properly a ferocious shooting war in the most demanding conditions, which have for the moment prevented any military reverses. Our Armed Forces will continue to give a good account of themselves. They will no doubt kill many Taliban and win specific engagements, but whether proper pacification by substantial western forces of the whole country under the present Government in Kabul will ever really be possible is open to question. It will certainly be defying history. I am now hopeful, particularly after this debate, that the Government will spend more time on serious strategic thinking and listen to and heed the advice of the chiefs of staff and those in the Foreign Office who really understand the area, for surely the time for routine political justification has passed. Should we not be asking ourselves, for instance, whether there is not another way of dealing with al-Qaeda, now more or less confined to the border area of Pakistan, than engaging in an open-ended battle against the Taliban and others who over centuries have resisted the presence of foreigners in their country? If this is not handled imaginatively, with full consultation with Pakistan, the elders of the area, perhaps even the Taliban itself, and with Kabul, terrorism may become more firmly planted than ever. To be as constructive as possible, we must, I believe—I hope that the penny has at last dropped—concentrate on a strategy of firm, intelligent ““containment”” of clearly identified threats, terrorist or otherwise, rather than on expeditionary interventions involving formed bodies of troops, so often counterproductive, just as we did successfully in the days of the Cold War, when there was also a conflict of ideology and a persistent and insidious subversive intention. ““Containment”” is not appeasement; it is reacting to circumstances and threats as they really are and not as sometimes it is politically expedient to present them. It means standing firm, ready to defend truly vital interests while keeping open opportunities for dialogue, against a background of a realistic balance of power, of which Iran is now a key piece. It involves, with the help of friendly states, building up and improving vital intelligence, so that we can give our security forces all the support to deal with, pre-emptively if possible, any terrorist or criminal activities threatening our national security, just as so far we appear to be doing very successfully in this country. In the Middle East, when the stigma of Iraq has faded, it means working with friendly Muslim states and others to help them to help themselves against extremism, using the expertise that circumstances have obliged us to acquire over the years. Generally, containment implies a dynamic diplomacy: a co-ordinated foreign and defence policy which shows respect for other nations and their predicament and gives priority, using the influence that we should have accrued with the United States, to solving the crucial issues that both motivate and fuel extremism. In particular, containment means trying with every sinew in our bodies—as the Prime Minister once put it in a remarkable speech in California—to get a fair, just and lasting solution to the Palestine problem. That must mean the state of Israel, which we helped to create and whose survival is essential, having the incentive which can only be provided by the Americans to sit round the table with all interested parties, militant and otherwise, with an unequivocal readiness to trade land—especially illegal settlements—for peace. That will not be an easy job. It may not work, but the longer it is left, especially after the events in Lebanon and Gaza, the harder it will get. Without an outcome to which a large part of the international community and the Security Council can, with a clear conscience and a glad heart, endorse and guarantee, there can be no peace in the area, no way of controlling extremism, and, as the noble Lord, Lord Jopling, just said, a real chance of an inexorable drift to a more general war. We need a coldly rational rethink of our whole Middle East policy and our relations with Islam. We have many fences to mend, as indeed we had 50 years ago at the time of the Suez crisis, when we also sought regime change and equally drew false conclusions about the real threat to our people and our interests. If we go on getting it wrong, the future, this time, could be grave indeed.