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Civil Aviation Bill

My Lords, in many ways I feel fortunate in that the appearance of this Bill at this stage will, I hope, save me from tabling numerous Questions relating to the health and safety of air crew and passengers flying in British aircraft. I do not believe that I need to remind the Minister, or other noble Lords of my track record in relation to ill health resulting from exposure to toxic chemicals. Under Clause 7 of this Bill, the Secretary of State is,"““charged with the general duty of organising, carrying out and encouraging measures for safeguarding the health of persons on board aircraft””." The Civil Aviation Authority—the CAA—is required to,"““provide advice and assistance in connection with any function””." Noble Lords might be relieved to hear that I propose to confine my comments to this clause alone. I have recently tabled several Written Questions relating to flight safety and passenger and crew health on commercial aircraft during contaminated air events. A ““contaminated air event”” occurs when the air supply provided to the passenger cabin and cockpit, which should be clean air, becomes contaminated with pyrolised engine oils or hydraulic fluids. One of the contaminants is an organophosphate known as TCP, hence my interest in this subject. Contaminated air events, which do not occur on all flights, appear to have caused pilots to become incapacitated or partially incapacitated. I wonder whether noble Lords are as surprised as I was to learn that the air supply to the cabin and cockpit, known as ““bleed air”” because it is bled off the engines, is not filtered in any way. Consequently, if that air becomes contaminated, passengers and crew inhale the contaminants. Even more surprising is the fact that commercial aircraft are not required to have contaminated air detection systems. Passenger safety depends entirely on pilots to take action if they suspect the air to be contaminated. A pilot’s sense of smell is not checked in their medical examinations, and some contaminants such as carbon monoxide have no smell. Is it really safe to rely on a pilot who may be suffering the early effects of chemical poisoning to respond correctly to an incident? The more deeply I have inquired into the issues the more interesting they become. As long ago as 1977, a 34 year-old navigator on a US Air National Guard Lockheed Hercules was incapacitated. A paper was written by the senior medical doctor for the National Air Guard, Dr Wier, who had treated the navigator. He clearly realised that the navigator had been exposed to and was suffering from the effects of contaminated air. In his paper, he stated that further investigation into the potential hazards from inhalation of synthetic oil fumes was definitely warranted. Some 28 years later, on 10 October 2005, just a few weeks ago, a British airline captain collapsed and vomited on the apron of Aberdeen airport following a similar exposure. While we are told that contaminated air events occur rarely—once in every 22,000 flights was the figure given in a Written Answer in 2000—that figure differs significantly from what the British Air Line Pilots Association reports. For example, in 2002, BALPA published the results of a survey of 105 responding pilots who experienced 1,600 contaminated air events in Boeing 757s, yet the CAA had less than 100 events on its database. That discrepancy alarms me. Apparent under-reporting on this scale should be a matter for concern, yet the Minister assured me in a Written Answer last week that,"““since all UK aircrew take aviation safety very seriously, there is no reason to believe that they would deliberately under-report occurrences involving impairment””.—[Official Report, 25/10/05; col. WA 168.]" Of course air crew take aviation safety seriously. Unless they are kamikaze pilots, they want to get to their destination as much as their passengers do. Under-reporting is a serious issue that should be investigated. I understand that BALPA asked the CAA to carry out a joint campaign to encourage crews to report all contaminated air events, but the authority declined. Additionally, according to BALPA, despite being asked to, the CAA has never contacted crews or their medical practitioners after contaminated air events to understand better the effects of exposures. I also understand that BALPA advised the CAA that TCP had been detected in commercial jet aircraft and that its members frequently recorded elevated levels of carbon monoxide. I wonder just why it is that the CAA declines to support seemingly sensible initiatives or follow up reports that concern passenger and crew health. Some conspiracy theorists apparently say that it is a well-known fact that the aircraft with the highest number of reported events per aircraft manufactured is British-made—the BAe 146. Others may suggest that it is simply because the CAA is totally funded by the industry, so the hand that feeds should not be bitten. In 2000, the CAA chief medical officer suspended a BAe 146 pilot’s medical certificate based upon the opinion of a neurophysiologist that the pilot was,"““probably suffering some sort of chemical exposure on a BAe 146””," and was, therefore, a threat to flight safety. In a Written Answer to Paul Tyler MP—now the noble Lord, Lord Tyler—the Minister stated that the CAA was,"““not aware of any adverse long term health effects in flight crew that can be traced back to the cabin environment””.—[Official Report, Commons, 9/2/04; col. 1234W.]" The pilot is still grounded. Following the contaminated air conference in April 2005, the Aviation Health Working Group stated:"““Representatives of the Department of Transport and the Department of Health attended the recent international conference on contaminated air, but no new evidence on the presence or effect of low levels of organophosphates in aircraft cabins was presented.””" I understand that, in fact, such evidence was presented. OPs were detected in the cabins of Boeing 757 and BAe 146 aircraft, and almost 20 doctors and scientists presented new papers with ground-breaking data. Despite publishing a paper in 2004 which indicated that air quality was within exposure limits, the sampling was never done during a contaminated air event. There appears to have been no attempt by the CAA to assess the long-term effects. Both the Australian and United States’ aviation administrations clearly take matters much more seriously than does the CAA. They have spent a lot of money investigating problems, and there is a current investigation by the USA. While I recognise that cabin and cockpit air quality is only a factor in the health and safety concerns to be addressed in Clause 7, it is a vital factor. There is some evidence that the CAA is somewhat reticent about carrying out its duty to protect air crews and the public from contaminated air events by not taking them as seriously as it should. It is our duty to ensure that such a situation should not be allowed to continue, and if I am not assured that this new clause will allay my concerns, I am prepared to bring forward amendments in Committee and at later stages of the Bill.