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Debate on the Address

My Lords, I had planned to say a word about the EU treaty among other things, but, inspired by the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Howell of Guildford, I plan to speak about the EU treaty only. I plan to urge that the debates in this House, as we consider ratification, focus on the relevant and leave aside the irrelevant. I heard two irrelevant questions today. Irrelevant question number one was the extent to which the reform treaty replicates in substance, if not in form, the constitutional treaty. The noble Lord, Lord Howell, discussed the matter at some length. Many Opposition spokesmen cite statesmen in the large majority of EU member states where the constitutional treaty had already been ratified. Naturally, and for obvious reasons, such statesmen tend to say that not much has been lost in the reform treaty. For them, that is true. Our Government, by contrast, tend to stress the difference between the two texts, as they apply to the UK. The new red lines have been successfully defended, the new exemptions, opt-outs, opt-ins, emergency brakes have been inserted specifically and only for the UK. They, too, are correct, although in other member states it is seen as puzzling and, to me, it is a little shaming, that the treaty should be commended here not for what it says but for changes, unique to the UK, compared to an earlier text which Ministers had previously agreed, signed and recommended for ratification. I hope that our debates here will not focus on textual comparisons, but on what the current text actually says. We are where we are. The second irrelevant question that came up this afternoon was whether the UK should be putting forward in the EU another prescription, better than the reform treaty. Some argue that the Brussels institutions have outlived or exceeded their purpose and that what is needed is the presentation by UK Ministers of a blueprint for a looser union, with some powers returned to the member states. I think that that is what the noble Lord, Lord Howell, was prescribing this afternoon. The Conservative Party’s principal spokesman in the convention that drafted the original constitutional treaty in 2002-03 did just that—with great energy and eloquence—and secured six supporters; six, in a convention of 207, and not one of those supporters came from a governing party or a party in a governing coalition. As I understand it, the Tory leadership has since been scouring eastern Europe for support for the Howell concept—the looser, weaker union—and has found some, mainly on the far right, mainly strongly nationalist, and hence against EU enlargement and immigration; mainly agrarian and hence against free trade and CAP reform. One might think them rather odd bedfellows for the party of Robert Peel, or of the noble Lord, Lord Howell. All 27 member state governments have, once again, followed a different course, agreeing on the present reform treaty, by unanimity. One can change the treaties only by unanimity. The ““flat-earth”” prescription is not negotiable; therefore, it is irrelevant; we are where we are. We have to consider the ratification of the existing treaty, not whether there should be a different kind of treaty. As we consider it, your Lordships might wish to look at four aspects, as they are probably seen across continental Europe as the most important. First, if the treaty is ratified, the European Council will have a full-time, fixed-term president. Six-monthly rotation worked well for six, nine, or 12 member states but does not work well for 27. Continental federalists, who have always been wary of the European Council, because it did not feature in Jean Monnet’s original vision, initially opposed the creation of the full-time presidency of the European Council. They thought that the creation of a second full-time senior post might undercut the authority of the President of the Commission. I favour the reform: technicians, like me, have a bias towards efficiency. Those who would prefer the EU to be inefficient might wish to oppose it. The House should consider where the UK’s interests lie. The second key aspect is the voting system. Qualified majority voting in the Council would, if the treaty were ratified by all, be by a new dual-majority system, requiring a majority of population as well as a majority of member states. Currently, there is a very weak correlation, weakened by successive enlargements, between population and votes. Representatives of 100,000 Maltese or Luxembourgers have the same voting weight as representatives of 3 million Germans. That looks like an anomaly that should be put right. Initially, small member states opposed the reform for the obvious reason. I always favoured it, not just because UK voting weight would go up by about 40 per cent, but also because I thought that the increase in QMV, made inevitable by enlargement, made it important to enhance the democratic legitimacy of decision-taking. Those who do not want the EU to be more democratically legitimate, or those who might want the UK to be more often outvoted, so making the EU more unpopular in this country, might wish to oppose the reform. It is for the House to decide. Thirdly, the coherence of the EU’s external diplomacy will undoubtedly be enhanced when the High Representative of the EU, already responsible for conducting the Common Foreign and Security Policy, is allowed to chair the Council and take part in debates in the Commission. Finally, the treaty tries to bring the EU closer to the citizen, and make it easier to follow. Now is not the time to debate the details of red and yellow cards. The central point is that national parliaments would be able, if they chose, to monitor EU legislation more effectively. How we in this House could best use those new powers is, I know, an issue to which the chairman of the EU Select Committee is now devoting considerable attention and his considerable energy. Making the election of the Commission President one of the first acts of each newly elected European Parliament would also give more meaning to European Parliament elections, and would probably raise voter turn-out. The secession clause in the treaty would prove, if proof were needed, that talk of an incipient superstate is mistaken: no state constitution has a secession clause. Those who would prefer the EU institutions to remain threatening, distant and remote might resist those reforms. The House should decide. We should keep in mind one other consideration as we think about ratification. What if we say no? The reform treaty is about making the EU work better. Unlike the Single European Act in 1985—with major extensions of qualified majority voting, which were necessary for the single market, and with the introduction of the Common Foreign and Security Policy—and unlike the 1991 treaty on the European Union—with its provisions for economic and monetary union, and the start of co-operation in justice and home affairs—this treaty is not about the conferral of new powers. This is about making the present systems work better. That is not an accident. In 2002, the EU convention consulted public opinion to discover what was wanted, and the answer was clear: try to introduce more transparency, simplicity and, above all, efficiency. Hard on the heels of 9/11, and at a time of severe splits over Iraq, people wanted the EU to be more effective in helping governments to deliver security, and more effective in pursuing European interests in the wider world. Very few wanted extensions of EU powers. Even fewer wanted reductions in EU powers. Everybody wanted the show to run better, and that was before the further complication of enlargement from 15 to 25, and now to 27. Five years on, 27 Governments think that this reform treaty has, in a modest way, done just that; that it will deliver efficiency; that the EU will work a little better. Most of our partners think it too modest, but better than nothing. I wonder what would happen, what signal we would send, if we were to decide that, on reflection, we do not favour efficiency, and do not want it to work better. They have put up with us reopening, in the first intergovernmental conference, deals struck in the Convention; and then reopening, in the second intergovernmental conference, agreements reached in the first. They have put up with us discovering new red lines, requiring new provisions particular to us, and further watering down the provisions applicable to all. Salami-slicing has been extremely skilfully done, and the sausage for the UK has got smaller and smaller. After all that, if we now take a straightforward Luddite line, saying that, on reflection, despite all the concessions to us, we would actually prefer to stick to the existing treaties, and existing unreformed institutions, because we do not want the EU to work better, our counterparts in other capitals might well be tempted to ask whether we really want to obstruct their wishes, and those of their people, or whether we would not prefer to step outside. Norway has access to the single market—though not, of course, to its rule-making—and willingly pays a price in the form of a contribution to, though not, of course, any receipts from, the EU budget. Is that what we want? I believe that to step outside would be a profound mistake. I also believe that the entry into force of the reform treaty is in the interests of the United Kingdom, on its merits. Those who take a different view on the latter question owe it to the House also to address the former, without resorting to ““flat-earth”” fantasy.