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Debate on the Address

My Lords, recently released from the shackles of the convenorship of the Cross-Bench Peers, I welcome the opportunity to comment, in the light of the gracious Speech, on the UK’s international objectives and specifically on public attitudes to our objectives in the European Union. This debate is already very wide; it covers, so far as I can see, the whole world and beyond to Armageddon, which the noble Lord, Lord Howell of Guildford, introduced into the discussion. Having spent much of my career in European affairs, both in the UK Civil Service and in the European Commission—I declare that interest in that I do, of course, have pensions from both sources—and although I shall speak mainly on European affairs, I shall comment first on the extremely important issue of the exit strategy from Iraq and, in due course, from Afghanistan, as many other speakers have done, particularly while the Israel/Palestinian issue is quite unresolved. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the depressingly long search for a settlement between Israel and the Palestinians are, except in one respect, immeasurably more important for Britain than the amending treaty is. I am sure that we will have a lot to say about that treaty, but these issues are more important. First, they are more important because of the saddest of all indicators: the loss of British lives and the number of Britons injured—perhaps many of us have not fully comprehended that number—the very large number of Iraqis killed or injured in the continuing high level of violence in Iraq since the invasion, and the human cost of the hostilities in Afghanistan. This can justly be described as grim. Secondly, they are more important because such violence over a long period has influenced opinions and nurtured extremism, and can profoundly change the attitude of groups or nations. We in Britain are among those who are most affected as a greater target for extremism, and we must recognise that enmities have been exacerbated and that the consequences will not disappear quickly. Our forces have performed to a very high standard, but the question now is simply the exit strategy. We have no vocation to remain in Iraq or Afghanistan; we have only to assess the advantages and disadvantages of how we proceed from here. I have one important point to make here. Ministers have been telling us regularly that we should leave Iraq when the national Government and the security forces can control the country and check violence, but the situation will never be so clear cut as this objective assumes. The reality must be that we should leave when the objective has a chance of being achieved within a reasonable timescale. We have to bear in mind the lesson of history, which is that liberators often come to be seen as the enemies of the people, or at least of some of the people, simply because they have invaded their country. Today, we have to balance the problems that the invading forces themselves represent against the need for the Iraqi nation itself to improve its own security. Too long a delay in exiting carries a real cost. Quicker may be better for all concerned. In the hope that by the end of the Session covered by the measures in the gracious Speech we shall see a much reduced role for our forces in Iraq, I turn now to European affairs, as many others have done. I begin with a plea for the Government to make as big an effort to tell the people the advantages of those European policies that they support as the effort that they make to explain where they have defended the UK’s position. It goes without saying that there are areas where we need to assert a defensive position in the European Union, so the phrase ““red lines”” is fully understandable. That is probably particularly so when changes in the existing treaty obligations are proposed. But we will have to make a decision soon—it is coming before the House—on the ratification of the amending treaty. At that time, I shall say a heartfelt thank you for the understanding that we shall not be called on to face another treaty-amending negotiation for very many years to come. The sequence has in each case had some justification, but the cumulative effect of the Single European Act, Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice, the constitutional treaty and now the amending treaty has weighed heavily on public reaction to the European Union. I feel it personally because I gave up many months of my life to the first three of those treaties. Indeed, my wife has decided that on my tombstone will be written my age less one year lost in the negotiations of the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties. It is customary for Ministers in debates such as this to say that the Government present positively the advantages that we gain from membership of the European Union, but I think that we could do with a bit more punch. That will be particularly true when the amending treaty has been ratified. Some of the more important policies, notably the single market, run themselves, or more accurately are run by those who are not directly concerned—business, commerce, the services, professions and so forth. We do not need to keep digging them up, but I repeat to the Minister that we need to do more to present and explain the UK’s role and its objectives not just on the controversial points but on other policies such as international trade, environment, research and so forth, which are continuing policies likely to be beneficial to us. However, in the immediate future, the amending treaty will play a major role, not only because of the process of ratification, but because of public reaction to the EU as a whole. The Minister will be pleased to hear that this is not the occasion to enter into all the nooks and crannies of the amending treaty, but I would like briefly to make three comments in support of the treaty. My first point is a practical one. The motivation for the amending treaty at this time was always largely practical, even though for the former constitutional treaty it was dressed in some finery. The European Union has to adapt its way of working to the huge impact of enlargement—now to 27 countries and probably soon to more. I was involved in the first four enlargements of the Community and know how big a difference enlargement makes and how you have to look again at how the Union runs itself. That is the purpose of the changes being made to the European Council and, in foreign policy, of the amalgamation of the roles of the High Representative and Vice-President of the Commission with external responsibilities. Secondly, there is much more explicit emphasis in the treaty on the role of the nation states, which have always been the makers and the masters of the union that they have created. I welcome the recognition in Article 1 that the powers of the European Union derive from the member states. Powers not specifically transferred of course remain with them. In recent years, it seemed obvious that the trend towards a more intergovernmental approach grows stronger. I can never understand how some critics have been able to assert the opposite. Thirdly, this amending treaty must give us stability so that we know clearly what is to be decided in the UK and what is covered by policies and decisions within the European Union. When I spoke previously on the constitutional treaty, I referred specifically to the passerelle clause, because it risked upsetting the idea that we had a stable situation resulting from the decisions. I note that this clause still exists, but subject to unanimity and, apparently, subject to approval by the House. Is that right? Is it prior approval? Does it mean both Houses? Perhaps the Minister would reply on that specific point.