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Debate on the Address

My Lords, it is a pleasure for several reasons to follow the noble Lord, Lord Williamson. It is now more than 18 years, I think, since he and I worked in partnership on these matters. Certainly, it is more than 18 years since, in the kind, euphemistic words of an American chairman the other day, I ““relinquished”” my position at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. I have some hesitation in entering this debate after that lapse of time, not least because there have been so many changes in the world during that time. I should also like to draw the attention of the House to some of the factors that have been involved as a result of those changes in our foreign policy and foreign policies around the world. First, on the plus side, there has been a substantial reduction in the British bilateral burden. Northern Ireland is no longer on the Foreign Office agenda; nor, for practical purposes, are Gibraltar or Hong Kong. Those positions have moved forward quite well. Secondly, however, there has been a huge explosion in a much wider multilateral agenda: namely, the widespread disruption of the Middle East; the upsurge in terrorism; the spreading of anxiety about the non-proliferation treaty, whether in Iran or northern Korea; the humanitarian catastrophes in Darfur, Myanmar and Zimbabwe; and the influx of a number of new, generally less stable, states to the world, such as Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova. Thirdly, there is the re-emergence of Russia, which, having lost an empire, is still looking for a role, under determined leadership, even if that is rather uncomfortable for the rest of us. Fourthly, there is a significant shift in the conduct of American foreign policy. I was unable to take part in the recent debate initiated by my noble friend Lord Saatchi on anti-Americanism, but had I done so, I should certainly have been, as he was, anti anti-Americanism. But one must face the fact that problems which previous administrations would instinctively have sought to handle through multilateral institutions—of which the United States had been one of the principal midwives—have more recently been more likely than not to promote what I may call the Bolton/Cheney unilateral response in the kind of forward aphorism that Deng Xiaoping always used to like, ““Like father, unlike son””. Fifthly—not the least important—there has been the growth and the impact on the world of a number of states which had previously been less than in the front line, such as Brazil, India or, surprisingly to some extent, the most important, China. China is hugely important. First, I must declare an interest. I visited China as long ago as 1978, then again during the Hong Kong negotiations, and long thereafter my life became heavily involved in the future of that territory. The number of people in the Foreign Office department dealing with Hong Kong rose from three to 23 during the negotiations. Finally, I have been for some years president of the Great Britain-China Centre, and indeed I was in China last month, as was the Minister. The reason why China’s presence on the world stage is so important is multi-faceted. Of course, one is first aware of its huge and continuing economic success, but that is by no means the only factor. When one considers the other features, it is worth recalling how much we can rely upon the good faith of China by looking at the way in which some of its key commitments in the Hong Kong negotiations have been maintained. They are remarkable commitments. For example, the Court of Final Appeal in Hong Kong still has in its membership two Members of your Lordships’ House, currently the noble and learned Lords, Lord Hoffmann and Lord Scott of Foscote. That was a remarkable proposition to have been accepted; it is still being faithfully observed and is of enormous help to the stability of the territory. A commitment yet to be fulfilled, but still remarkable, is not just the accountability of the Executive to an elected assembly, but also the commitment to increasing progress towards universal suffrage for it. It will be a great advantage, as both the noble Lord, Lord Malloch-Brown, and I pointed out, to see steady progress towards the fulfilment of that last commitment. In China itself there have been positive developments, some of which have been taking place over the whole of the past 30 years since Deng Xiaoping successfully replaced the Gang of Four. But it is not just about China’s dramatic economic growth. It is fashionable for some commentators to respond to that by saying, ““That’s all very well, but look at the rest of the record, which is alarming and disturbing””. The Economist, a magazine that I have respected for many years, in its issue of 30 June spoke of China as a ““viciously repressive dictatorship””. While the Chinese themselves would concede that much still remains to be done, I do not think that the analysis is helped at all by hyperbole of that kind. It is important to recognise that there has already been much improvement in the conditions of the ordinary Chinese citizen. The other day I received a pamphlet produced on behalf of a group of people from North Korea who escaped to China with the assistance of a significantly courageous Christian priest. These people produced a booklet describing their reaction on arriving in China: "““The first thing to notice in China was abundance in food. There are foods everywhere. There are clothes everywhere. Second, freedom is guaranteed””." That may be a slight overstatement, but it is what they say. "““Third, personal property and possessions are permitted. The harvest is mine to keep. When I gain profit by business, it is also mine to keep. Fourth, there is freedom of residence, freedom of speech, and freedom to travel … I could move to an area of my choice … I became aware of the fact that North Korea is the only country where you have to apply for a pass to travel from place to place””." It is clear that, understandably enough, China is there seen through rose-tinted spectacles, but it certainly deserves to be taken into account. Beyond that, China is playing a much larger international role. It is developing a worldwide network of investment, for the most part in developing countries, and an increasingly effective and widespread diplomatic representation, often in countries where we are closing our own posts, such as in Madagascar. China recognises the need for soft power in a way that the United States seems to have forgotten with the establishment of Confucius Foundation Centres around the world, including in this country. Further, China has been particularly useful over the more difficult international problems facing us in recent years. The North Korea nuclear programme has been tackled successfully because China was one of the six participants in the six-party talks. On Darfur, having hesitated for some time, China supported Resolution 1769; it has appointed an envoy to the country and has sent almost 200 engineers to support what has been done there. Even in Myanmar, which raises difficulties because of its proximity, Miss Suu Kyi requires all the support she can get, and there has been some support. It is very unlikely, for example, that the UN representative, Mr Gambari, would have gone there recently had it not been for Chinese intervention. It is encouraging to record the conclusions of the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, which I do not often quote in this House or anywhere else. It committed itself, in what is a kind of equivalent of the Queen’s Speech, to a continuation of ““reform and opening up”” and to ““continuing to take an active part in multilateral affairs””. There is, as I have said, much scope for it to do more, and we should work from there. I hope your Lordships will forgive me if I go on for a minute or two more, otherwise I shall miss the central point. That is the setting in which the United Kingdom and France, as permanent members of the Security Council, need to mobilise and manage our foreign policies. I am afraid I react with less than enthusiasm to the attempt of my noble friend Lord Howell to emulate the noble Baroness, Lady Thatcher, with his, ““No, no, no””. It tends to get the hackles rising. Of course I have enormous respect for the Commonwealth. One of the most valuable qualifications for the United Kingdom Chancellor of the Exchequer going to the IMF was preceding it by attending Commonwealth Finance Ministers meetings. Unlike the United States Treasury Secretary, we had an understanding of many of the colonies, from Grenada to India, and a wider perception of the world. But, having attended half a dozen Commonwealth conferences and about 15 European Council meetings, it is clear to me that we were much more able to achieve some agreements of a collective and effective kind in the European Councils than we ever were on matters of substance with the Commonwealth. But there is much scope for ““networking””—another favourite word of my noble friend—in that context. But it is tempting, is it not, for France and Britain, as seems to be happening this week, to believe that we can handle all these things vis-à-vis the United States by our very own special relationship? Ours is built on the Magna Carta and France’s on the sacking of the Bastille, I suppose; they are different badges of democratic freedom. But it may not be possible for that to happen. Finally, let me address the issue of the treaty to which much reference has been given. I cannot help recalling that one of the documents which I handed to Chancellor Kohl in 1985, with Margaret Thatcher present, was entitled ““Europe: The Future””, which contained our support for progressive movement towards an increasingly co-operative European foreign policy. That is what the Single European Act was about and it remains one of the most important components for addressing the world as it is today. It is exactly the kind of solution we need and for which we have been campaigning for a very long time. For the reasons explained by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, and underlined by the noble Lord, Lord Williamson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Symons, it is an entirely sensible treaty. It contains measures which are essential to the operation of our foreign policy if it is to be amplified by partnership in the kind of world in which we live. I am distressed by the dilemma that has been created because democratic competition has landed both our major parties with a commitment to a referendum on this issue. I cannot believe that the prospect of a referendum on this treaty—worst of all if the treaty had already entered into force—will be of any value at all. Indeed, at this time, the prospect of a referendum is disruptive to a certain extent. That is what happened in 1975. There was a hiatus in which the foreign policy of this country and a lot of its business was paralysed because of uncertainty about our position. So, while I can understand why we have got into the hole in which we find ourselves, I endorse the speeches of noble Lords who can see that the only way out of it is by proceeding now with the implementation of the treaty, negotiated and renegotiated, as it has already been. Accepted by everybody but ourselves, there is a limit to the extent to which we can remain in a corner of our own making.