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Debate on the Address

My Lords, I make no apology for devoting a substantial part of my contribution to this debate to the EU reform treaty, which this House will be called on to clear for ratification in the coming months. Not only is this legislation an important element of the legislative programme before us, but also it is of great significance for the future development of the European Union. I do not wish to plunge into the scholastic debate about whether the treaty is of greater or lesser weight and significance than previous EU treaties, which have hitherto invariably been ratified by this country following parliamentary procedures; nor shall I dwell on the equally scholastic debate about whether the treaty is ““broadly equivalent”” to the constitutional treaty which has now been dropped, except to observe that the scrutiny committee in another place might have done well to study the carefully argued opinion of the Dutch Council of State, to the effect that the treaty is not broadly equivalent to the constitutional treaty, even for member states which are not covered by the special provisions negotiated for the UK. It would have done well to think of that before reaching its own not very rigorously or even clearly reasoned contrary conclusion. I shall focus on an examination of whether the main provisions and innovations of the new treaty are likely to lead to the better functioning of the European Union and are in this country’s interest. This is an angle of approach simply ignored so far in our national debate—though not, I am glad to say, in this House this afternoon—including in the Prime Minister's Statement after the recent European Council in Lisbon. Surely it needs to be at the centre of any process of decision to ratify this treaty. Let us look at four main issues: the reform of the Union’s institutional structures with regard to foreign policy; the creation of the office of the president of the European Council; the involvement for the first time of national Parliaments in the Union’s legislative procedures; and the extensions of qualified majority voting, particular in the field of home affairs and immigration. The common foreign policy of the European Union has expanded rapidly in recent years, with every step decided by unanimity. It is hard to believe that it will not continue to do so, with so many of the threats and challenges that Europe faces capable of being handled only by a united collective effort. Europe is in the lead in stabilising the Balkans, a key player in the Middle East peace process, the international community spokesman in the effort to deal with Iran’s nuclear programme and is deploying security missions in Bosnia, Gaza, the West Bank, Chad and the Central African Republic. Only those in a state of total denial could fail to recognise the scale of this development. But the European Union is, to use a hackneyed phrase, punching well below its weight, which is partly but not exclusively due to the complexity, duplication and confusion of its foreign policy machinery. The enhanced role of a high representative, his or her double-hatting to bring together the impact of the Council and the Commission, and the development of an external action service, are all steps to remedy—and they should do so, bringing about a more coherent and effective implementation of all the instruments of external policy than has hitherto been possible. The new post of the president of the European Council, together with the provisions on foreign policy, marks the effective end of the rotating presidency—and not before time. A device that worked well for a community of six, nine or even 12, a community with no major foreign policy responsibilities, has become hopelessly anachronistic and even counterproductive for a Union of 27 with a growing external policy dimension. Presidencies skewed towards the priorities of this or that member state, lack of continuity and sustained effort, lack even of representation in many parts of the world when a small member state holds the presidency—all those weaknesses need to be and should be remedied. The balance between the supranational institutions, the Commission and the Parliament and the intergovernmental ones such as the Council, has been shifted, albeit modestly, towards the latter. Subsidiarity is an ugly word and an obscure concept, but it does matter if the centralising tendencies of the Brussels institutions are to be subjected to a reality check when legislative proposals are brought forward. Giving national Parliaments a role in that reality check surely makes sense. Some argue that the provisions in the new treaty will be ineffective, but we will know whether that is so only when we, the national Parliaments, have tried to make use of them—and without the treaty we will have no chance to make use of them. As to the extension of qualified majority voting, I can often hardly believe my eyes when I read what is written about it in the press. The words ““surrender”” and ““sovereignty”” tumble out as if we had not on balance benefited enormously from the use of qualified majority voting and hardly ever been voted down. Without qualified majority voting, we would not now have the single market. Would that have been in our interests? In this treaty, the main areas shifted from unanimity to qualified majority voting are either clearly in our interests, such as with energy policy, or leave us with an opt-out. Sovereignty is a bit like the biblical parable of the talents. Do we want to cling on to an asset that is increasingly difficult to use effectively on our own or do we want to increase its effectiveness by using it in concert with others? In all these four main areas and in any others, such as the reduction in the size of the Commission, Britain will benefit substantially from the entry and force of the new treaty. No doubt there are many other complex issues in it, which we will need to examine in detail in the months ahead; but it would be good if that debate could be a hard-headed one, focused on the actual provisions of the treaty, not the usual jumble of myths and unsubstantiated assertions that often seem based on an assumption that we are locked in a life-or-death struggle against our fellow Europeans, not, as is in fact the case, trying to work out how best to co-operate with them to our mutual advantage. I turn from a subject that many may feel we spend too much of our time discussing to one, disarmament, which I suggest we spend far too little time discussing. In the last decade of the Cold War and in the years immediately following its end, the world made some major advances towards a reduction in armaments and a strengthening of the policies restraining the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Chemical Weapons Convention came into force; the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was extended sine die; the two nuclear super powers, the US and the Soviet Union, reduced their arsenals; regional agreements such as that on Conventional Forces in Europe were negotiated; and a number of regional nuclear-free zones were agreed. Iraq’s attempt to break out of these multilateral disciplines was frustrated. But since the turn of the century, the international community has neglected this field. Indeed, there has been regression. Now we face the risk that these disciplines will be flouted and eroded, leading to a much less, not more, secure world. Is it too late to do anything about this to reverse this dangerous trend? I do not believe so. It is late but not too late. Next year new presidents will be elected in Russia and the United States. That should provide an opportunity to relaunch the process of both bilateral and multilateral disarmament and arms control. Already a debate is under way in the United States, led by statesmen of impeccably realist credentials such as George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, Bill Perry and Sam Nunn, about the need to move towards nuclear disarmament. It is surely time that we turned this domestic US debate into an international one. We should be contributing our own ideas and our own willingness to play a part. Some of the proposals we are contributing already—the idea of an arms trade treaty and the uranium enrichment bank—are excellent ones; others would be if they were taken further. We should move decisively to ban all cluster munitions, not hide behind an unconvincing and unsustainable distinction between dumb and smart munitions. But what is still lacking in our Government’s programme is an overall political concept and the promotion of this policy area much higher up the list of the UK’s foreign policy priorities. The former Foreign Secretary, Margaret Beckett, made a good start in her last days in office with her Washington speech to the Carnegie Institute last June. What would be good now would be for the new Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister to take up the baton and play a leading role in the discussion of these issues both within Europe—I include Russia in that term—and across the Atlantic. I fear that if we do not create an opening towards a renewed disarmament and counter proliferation strategy within the next two years—and no one should doubt that these two things are indissolubly linked—the opportunity will not recur any time soon, if ever.