---

Civil Aviation Bill

moved Amendment No. 13:"Page 3, leave out lines 34 to 36 and insert—" ““(1)   The Secretary of State shall establish an independent body to establish, maintain and monitor a penalty scheme.”” The noble Lord said: At Second Reading, there was a lot of unease in your Lordships’ House that these measures were tantamount to a privatisation of justice. Concern was expressed about the appropriateness of allowing a private company to establish a charging regime in which it would not only determine the circumstances for the collection of such charges but would also choose how to distribute the proceeds of the fines. These amendments are designed to address those concerns and to probe the Minister further on the creation of penalty schemes for aircraft that breach noise requirements. I must emphasise now that I am by no means opposed to the concept of using financial penalties to control the impact of aircraft noise for the benefit of persons disadvantaged by it. However, I am concerned at the manner in which the Bill proposes to introduce and administer such schemes. I have already touched briefly on the serious concern that we discussed previously—the prospect that an airport operator could be responsible for deciding which noise and emissions objectives should be adopted and could then create a charging regime to enforce them. As I stated at Second Reading, in effect that would enable the airport operator to act as judge, jury and policeman. In short, the ““relevant manager””—a person, I might add, whose interests are served by the very same airlines he would be licensed to charge—would be empowered to determine the appropriate level of noise at which to charge. As we have already discussed, given that there is already considerable mistrust among local communities in relation to the fairness, objectivity and transparency of the current in-house arrangements for monitoring aircraft noise and emissions, the fact that such an individual should be sanctioned by the Secretary of State to oversee matters of such fundamental importance is very surprising. Serious concern has also been expressed by the country’s two leading airlines—British Airways and Virgin Atlantic. Despite agreement in principle to the use of financial incentives to encourage the use of lower noise and emissions, British Airways writes that,"““these powers could easily create a conflict of interests where an aerodrome or the Secretary of State sets a limit or increases a fine so as to create a fund for local projects without cost to themselves . . . Governance arrangements are therefore needed to ensure the fines are proportionate, proceeds of the fines are spent appropriately and users are consulted””." At the very least, it is reasonable to have some process for accounting for how monies derived from penalty charges are spent, especially when one considers that the individual who controls that spending is the same person who decided that the fine was applicable in the first place. Conversely, how can we be sure that the fines levelled are of a value commensurate with the severity of the breach? I understand from the Explanatory Notes that the proposed charges will not exceed level 5 on the standard scale, which amounts to £5,000. Moreover, how can we be sure that the penalty scheme, once initiated, is properly enforced? Who will monitor such penalty schemes when they are established so as to ensure that the aerodrome managers are enforcing them effectively and justly? It is important for both the public and the airline operators to have confidence in the equity of such a scheme. Again, from my studies of the Bill I learn that, much like the incorporation of noise and emissions considerations into landing charges, penalty schemes will also be introduced on a voluntary basis. However, as the Secretary of State reserves the right in certain circumstances to compel an aerodrome to adopt a penalty-charging scheme, I am interested to know what those circumstances would be and how such a scheme would be designed, implemented and monitored. If an airport were reluctant to initiate a penalty scheme of its own volition, how could one be assured that, once compelled by the Secretary of State, the scheme would be properly enforced? Furthermore, how will the area to benefit from these charges be determined? For example, will the person who is affected in the small hours of the morning by a noise event resulting from an aeroplane having strayed from its flight path receive any benefit from the fining of the airline operator; or will these compensations be reserved only for people in the immediate vicinity of the aerodrome? These amendments offer the opportunity to inject some much-needed accountability and consultation, elements that are conspicuously absent from the Bill. At present, where and on what penalties are spent seems to be based entirely upon the judgment of an individual. As I mentioned at Second Reading, such an individual could have a vested interest, or even relatives in the vicinity of the airport. If these decisions are left entirely to the relevant manager, should there not be more transparency at the very least? How does a member of the public who feels certain that aircraft are in breach of a penalty scheme ascertain whether the aircraft have been appropriately punished? In its current form, the Bill lacks the requisite checks and balances necessary to ensure that the charges are administered in an appropriate fashion and that fines are collected for the direct benefit of those affected by aircraft noise. I beg to move.